For Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger’s new force to succeed, relations with neighbouring countries need to be rebuilt.

The Alliance of Sahel States’ new 6 000-strong Unified Force (AES Unified Force) seeks to consolidate Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger’s military capabilities in response to jihadist violence and enhance cross-border operational coordination.

Launched in December 2025, the force is headquartered in Niamey, Niger. This is the third attempt by central Sahel states to establish a joint security mechanism. It follows the stillborn Multinational Joint Task Force to secure the Liptako-Gourma region announced in January 2017, and the G5 Sahel Joint Force established in July 2017.

The G5 Sahel Joint Force brought together contingents from Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Chad. It became ineffective after the AES countries (Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger) withdrew in 2022-3. All three had experienced coups, and their military governments rejected the G5 framework as emblematic of the Western, particularly French, influence they sought to break from.

Unlike its predecessors, the AES Unified Force is underpinned by member states' determination to preserve their sovereignty. It also benefits from strong political alignment and close coordination between the three governments.

The force is expected to build on the effective coordination demonstrated by the armies of the AES states during the tripartite Operation Yereko 2. The mission was conducted between February and March 2025 in the Liptako Gourma area, where the borders of the three countries meet.

The AES governments also appear to have learnt from the experience of the G5 Sahel Joint Force, which, over its five years of existence, failed to establish a decisive operational presence.

The G5 force conducted 25 security operations that its 2021 commander, General Oumarou Namata, said led to the neutralisation of hundreds of terrorists and the seizure and destruction of significant quantities of equipment. But the force ultimately failed to curb the expansion of the terrorism threat or reduce its intensity.

The G5 Sahel Joint Force was hampered by chronic underfunding. Its annual operating budget, initially set at €423 million, far exceeded the contributions of its member states, making the force heavily dependent on external partners. Likewise, the lack of adequate air assets and a functional intelligence system – critical for counter-terrorism operations – significantly undermined its capabilities.

These shortcomings left the central Sahel states dependent on France and its Operation Barkhane, both for mobilising financial support and for conducting joint military operations, thereby limiting Sahelian countries’ autonomy.

AES states are determined to preserve the independence of their new force. Details on the three countries’ individual financial contributions have not been made public. However, they are leveraging domestic resources through three primary mechanisms: Burkina Faso’s Patriotic Support Fund, Niger’s Solidarity Fund for the Safeguarding of the Homeland and Mali’s Support Fund for Basic Infrastructure and Social Development Projects.

This commitment to financial autonomy aligns with the AES founding charter, which stipulates that ‘the financing of the Alliance shall be provided by contributions from the member states.’ On 28 March 2025, the three countries agreed to introduce a 0.5% import levy to fund confederal institutions, including the AES Unified Force.

At the same time, AES countries are diversifying their military cooperation partnerships, preventing the unified force from becoming overly dependent on a single external country.

Equipment and weapons are procured from Russia, Turkey, Iran and China. Russia’s Africa Corps is the AES’ preferred security partner, although the terms of engagement vary significantly. In Mali, Russia supplies military equipment, and African Corps is involved in combat operations. In Burkina Faso and Niger, engagement is limited to training.

Operationally, G5 Sahel Joint Force battalions were confined to designated geographic sectors, with pursuit rights limited to a 100 km radius on either side of national borders. In contrast, AES Unified Force units are intended to operate across all three countries.

Headquarters has full operational authority over the troops, allowing it to deploy and move troops without prior approval from national general staffs – a major structural constraint for the G5 Sahel.

However, this regional operational autonomy must be closely integrated with national security structures. The AES Unified Force’s effectiveness will depend on how clearly its role is aligned with the operations of national defence and security forces, including components not formally under its command.

AES member states must also avoid the major pitfall of the past decade of international Sahel interventions: a siloed approach that treats the Sahel in isolation from neighbouring West African countries.

The force’s effectiveness will depend on its ability to cooperate with the armies of neighbouring states – many of which also face threats of violent extremism and crime networks. Channels for the illicit supply and smuggling of operational resources (weapons, motorcycles, fuel, drones, etc.) to armed groups cross many borders in the region.

Despite their political differences with non-AES states, regional stability requires that the three countries maintain or strengthen military and security cooperation with their immediate neighbours, including Nigeria, Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Togo, Ghana, Guinea and Senegal.

The three AES countries should adopt a pragmatic approach, drawing lessons from Exercise Tarha Nakal conducted by Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Chad and Togo’s armed forces in May 2024 in Tillia, Niger. These countries showed their ability to pool resources and coordinate operations.

The African Union is well placed to resolve tensions between AES countries and their West African neighbours in the Gulf of Guinea. Politically, mediation efforts could rebuild trust and ease tensions. Regarding counter-terrorism, the AU could promote cooperation between the Economic Community of West African States’ anti-terrorism force and the AES Unified Force.

Written by Leylatou Saidou Daoura, Research Fellow, ISS Regional Office for West Africa and the Sahel & Rahinatou Leïla Salia, Research Fellow, ISS Regional Office for West Africa and the Sahel