Kenya’s police have achieved some positive results, but lasting solutions require ongoing cooperation between the two countries.

In February, Kenyan police launched Operation Ondoa Jangili (‘remove the criminals’) as part of security measures to drive the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) out of hideouts in Isiolo and Marsabit counties.

The OLA is an informal militia fighting for self-determination for Ethiopia’s Oromo ethnic group in the south of the country. Owing to its political orientation and culture of violence, it has frequently escaped Ethiopian authorities by crossing into Kenya. Marsabit and Isiolo are home to the Borana and Gabbra communities, both of which speak Oromo, thus providing cover for the OLA through ethnic affinity.

Ethiopia’s National Intelligence and Security Service says the armed group broke away from the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) after the OLF renounced the armed struggle in 2018. Ethiopian intelligence says the OLA has established ties with the terrorist group al-Shabaab in Somalia and is involved in illicit activities such as arms trafficking and illegal mining.

The Kenya Police Service has also accused the group of engaging in arms, drug and human trafficking, illegal mining, kidnapping for ransom and instigating tribal conflicts.

In August 2024, two South Koreans were abducted from their Odda Mission Church residence in Moyale and allegedly handed to al-Shabaab in what Ethiopian intelligence says was an OLA-al-Shabaab collaboration. The OLA denies the claim.

Kenya-Ethiopia cross-border insecurity

The OLA says it has no presence in Kenya. This contradicts the country’s National Intelligence Service Director-General Noordin Haji, who told a parliamentary oversight committee that the OLA was occupying Kenyan territory.

The group has reiterated its commitment to ensuring the safety of Kenyan communities living along the border, pledging to respect Kenya’s territorial integrity and expressing willingness to cooperate with authorities. The OLA accused Ethiopia’s army and intelligence of facilitating transnational criminal networks and cautioned Kenya not to be misled and to maintain its balanced approach to regional stability.

Kenyans living along the border are caught in the crossfire, often being detained by security forces for allegedly harbouring OLA fighters. Community members also face harassment by the OLA, which accuses them of spying for Kenya and Ethiopia’s governments. The Kenya National Commission on Human Rights says the ongoing police operation has sparked an outcry from those affected, who report human rights violations by the security forces.

A lack of coordinated Kenyan–Ethiopian security force patrols along their porous border, marginalisation of border communities by both governments, and weak state institutions lacking the capacity to respond to distress calls have all worked in the OLA’s favour.

A resident told ISS Today that previous efforts by both Kenyan and Ethiopian security agencies to contain the OLA’s activities were disjointed. That allowed the group to easily melt into the Kenyan population across the border when escaping Ethiopian authorities.

As a result of OLA’s incursions and a mismatch in Kenya and Ethiopia’s firearm policies, the border region has suffered an influx of small arms. Kenya controls the licensing of arms, while in Ethiopia, civilians can legally own guns after registering them with the federal government. This fuels a cycle of insecurity as border communities acquire illicit arms for self-defence, creating a ready market for arms traffickers and the OLA.

In August 2024, in the build-up to the current police operation, Kenya and Ethiopia signed a memorandum of understanding on security cooperation through intelligence sharing and coordinated operations. The countries also had a security defence pact ratified in 1964, which, among other things, allowed them to support each other if a third party attacked them. However, the pact lost significance as the Somalian threat at that time waned.

Kenya’s operation has uncovered 14 makeshift camps believed to be used by OLA members, 10 firearms, ammunition, fake US dollars and Ethiopian birr, and propaganda literature in Oromo. Several people with alleged links to the group were arrested, and police claim to have disrupted human and arms trafficking networks while curtailing cross-border incursions and kidnappings.

These are positive achievements. But as with all security force operations, the successes can generally only be sustained while the operation is active. Once it ends, illicit activities could resume. Longer-term measures and prevention strategies are also vital.

For example, coordinated and ongoing joint cross-border security patrols, combined with state investment in infrastructure such as roads and education facilities in border areas are needed. That would protect border communities and facilitate trade and investment, bringing stability after decades of upheaval.

Kenya and Ethiopia should also establish a permanent joint border security management framework, including a 24-hour one-stop border post at Moyale and formal border posts in Forolle, Elhadi and Dukana. This would encourage trade and check the movement of criminal actors and contraband across the border.

Also, while factionalism within insurgent groups makes engaging in meaningful peace talks hard, Ethiopia’s government should consider dialogue with the OLA, as happened in 2023. Ironing out contentious issues and building trust could help settle the disputes among the conflict parties.

Lastly, security forces must adhere to the law when carrying out operations, particularly concerning human rights. This would build trust between them and local communities, with knock-on positive effects for intelligence sharing, and tracking and arresting suspects.

Written by Guyo Chepe Turi, Research Officer, East Africa Peace and Security Governance, ISS Nairobi