Incumbent presidents and ruling parties increasingly bend the law to entrench their power and silence opposition.

The use of legal tools to entrench political power and sideline opponents is increasing in Africa. This ‘lawfare’ often presents as presidential term-limit manipulations, reshuffles of the judiciary and exploitation of legal procedures to sustain power.

The tactic has emerged across the continent in countries such as Zimbabwe, Zambia, Tanzania, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Togo. It undermines public trust in democratic institutions and creates an uneven political playing field.

As the African Union (AU) tries to advance good governance, tackling lawfare must become indispensable in curtailing democratic backsliding.

Lawfare manifests differently in different countries. A recent trend is to manipulate legal provisions defining crucial dimensions of political power. This ranges from the subtle use of ambiguous laws to tilt the political scale in favour of incumbents, to overt constitutional amendments.

One example of the more subtle approach is using legal processes to exclude opposition parties from elections under the guise of non-compliance with electoral laws. In Tanzania, the Independent National Electoral Commission disqualified the main opposition party, Chama cha Demokrasia (Chadema), ahead of the October 2025 elections, for refusing to sign a new electoral code of ethics.

While Tanzania’s 2024 elections law mandates compliance, neither the Constitution nor the electoral commission has the power to disqualify parties on that basis. Yet the law was interpreted to exclude the Chadema candidate, giving the ruling party the political advantage and setting a precedent for other provisions to be similarly weaponised.

The phenomenon also shows up in contradictory court rulings that sometimes point to underlying political interests. In Zambia, questions arose about the 2018 Constitutional Court decision that then-president Edgar Lungu’s first term didn’t count towards the two five-year term limits. Lungu had appointed several of the deciding judges, whose collective ruling allowed him to run for a third term.

In 2024, the same court – under a new administration and with several judges removed – reversed that ruling. As a result, Lungu was blocked from contesting the 2026 election. And this time, the court’s decision handed President Hakainde Hichilema an advantage. (Lungu, who remained politically active, died yesterday, on 5 June.)

The lack of consistency in Zambia’s constitutional court rulings inadvertently exposed how laws and their associated rulings could be manipulated for political gain.

Rather than violating the law outright, these examples show how incumbents use legal loopholes, time key appointments to neutralise opposition, or selectively enforce court decisions and regulations. This makes detecting and countering lawfare difficult – and threatens democratic accountability across the continent.

A more overt manifestation of lawfare is the use of constitutional review processes and the redesign of institutions to entrench power. These tactics preserve a veneer of procedure while advancing the political goals of certain individuals. Decisions are based on parliamentary votes or referendums but seldom adhere to the spirit of a country’s constitution.

A recurring pattern is resetting term limits, reframing executive powers or overhauling the political system to favour incumbents. This has happened in the DRC, Zimbabwe and Togo. In the DRC, President Félix Tshisekedi announced plans to reform and ‘Congolicise’ the 2006 constitution owing to perceptions that it was the product of international mediation. His critics interpret this as a third-term bid.

In Zimbabwe, President Emmerson Mnangagwa has denied seeking a third term. But recent statements by Justice Minister Ziyambi Ziyambi about ‘clarifying’ the constitution raised concerns and led to protests by opposition groups.

In Togo, constitutional reforms in 2024 transformed Togo’s presidential political system into a parliamentary one without direct presidential elections. The ruling party said the move would strengthen democracy, but for the opposition and civil society, it amounted to a ‘constitutional coup d’état aimed at circumventing presidential term limits.’

These tactics quietly erode inherent checks and balances in Africa’s political institutions. Courts and legislatures are being repurposed for partisan ends, and the line between legality and manipulation is being blurred. All these actions set a precedent that will undermine the integrity of political institutions and the fairness of elections.

The result is often instability. In Zimbabwe, weariness over apparent third-termism has strained relations with war veterans and sections of the security sector crucial to regime stability. In the DRC, the trend is diverting AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) attention from resolving the crisis in the country's east. In Togo, already fragile civil-military relations could be inflamed.

The AU has strong tools to deal with the situation. The African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, particularly Article 23(5), explicitly prohibits constitutional amendments and revisions contrary to the principles of democratic change of government. But enforcement has been selective and limited.

The PSC has acted only in cases such as Burundi’s 2015/16 third-term crisis, where four separate council communiqués attempted to prevent then-president Pierre Nkurunziza’s bid. When lawfare has been more subtle, with legality carefully masking democratic backsliding, the council has remained largely inactive.

Because lawfare tactics aren’t covered in the annual state of peace and security report presented to the AU Assembly, actions are limited to monitoring and early warning. The PSC could expand the AU’s bi-annual election reporting to include the manipulation of legal provisions. This would raise awareness and bring issues onto the PSC agenda before democratic erosion deepens.

Exposing the increasing sophistication of the phenomenon will provide a basis for proactive responses. Without more assertive action, Africa risks a future where democracy dwindles not through soldiers and tanks in the streets, but the quiet turning of legal gears.

Written by Zenge Simakoloyi, Research Officer, Africa Peace and Security Governance, ISS

This article was first published in the ISS PSC Report