Water scarcity in Africa is a crisis, and the GERD conflict shows why mutually beneficial cooperation agreements are vital.

Ethiopia officially inaugurated the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Blue Nile river in the week of September when the country hosted the second African Climate Summit. The occasion was one of great celebration, national pride and international recognition, with Kenya’s President William Ruto signing a deal to buy electricity generated by the dam.

Ethiopia seems to have initiated a reset in water politics in the Nile Basin after millennia of domination by its downstream neighbour, Egypt. What does this mean for relations with the Nile Basin countries? Are there implications for wider water politics in Africa? And, is water the next oil, or has oil just been a temporary decoy from one of the primary precipitators of human conflict – fighting over water?

Water scarcity in Africa is a crisis, and the cost is monumental. An estimated 411-million people lack access to safe water, 779-million to safe sanitation services, and 839-million to basic hygiene services, says African Development Bank Vice-President Beth Dunford.

Victims are disproportionately marginalised groups. Children in Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia make up half of those affected by the Horn of Africa’s water crisis, according to the United Nations Children’s Fund.

In the wake of this increasing scarcity, we can expect a concomitant increase in water-related conflict, potentially including violent conflict at multiple levels. Security risks associated with water challenges are set to rise unless we pursue sustainable water cooperation agreements and protocols.

The GERD on the Blue Nile, Ethiopia

The GERD has induced a hydropolitics shift that could either exacerbate tensions and conflict, or lead to better security architecture in the Nile Basin and – because of its significance – in Africa as a whole.

Egypt’s control of the Nile is legendary. Although Ethiopia can lay claim to being a cradle of humankind, Egypt has controlled and exploited the Nile downstream to create an important chapter in human history and development. GERD’s construction changes that dynamic fundamentally. Ethiopia has achieved a hydropolitical balance and could further challenge Egypt’s dominance among the other Nile Basin countries as well.

How did Ethiopia bring this century-old ambition to fruition, and outsmart the Egyptian Eagle in achieving it? The crux was timing. The updated Agreement on the Nile Basin Cooperative Framework was negotiated and signed in 2010 and came into force in 2011. During this time, the Arab Spring had taken Egypt’s eye off the ball.

The Hosni Mubarak regime, in the tradition of the Anwar Sadat years, had the Nile and Suez as primary foreign policy priorities. The Arab Spring ended Mubarak’s control, introducing a civilian government under Mohamed Morsi, who was in turn removed in 2013 by a military-led coalition under General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi – now the country’s civilian president.

The net result was less attention to the intricacies of the Nile framework negotiations. GERD’s implementation was accelerated first under Ethiopia’s Meles Zenawi, followed by Hailemariam Desalegn, and completed under Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali.

The GERD hydroelectric plant contributes significantly to ending Ethiopia’s power deficit in electricity, producing 5 100 MW, close to its design capacity. But it arguably also offers downstream flood mitigation.

Its design as a national project, with ordinary Ethiopians given the chance to contribute, lends weight to the slogans claiming that the dam was built on the blood, sweat and tears of the public. GERD has provided a badly needed national convergence project in the wake of internal conflict.

However, some Ethiopian leaders are pressing for a move to consumptive use, pushing for more dams to be built on other Nile tributaries. If pursued, this would reduce downstream flows, creating a difficult water conundrum for Egypt.

As a result, Egypt officially registered its objection to GERD at the UN Security Council on 9 September – the day of the dam’s inauguration. Ethiopia quickly responded without fear of confrontation, accusing Egypt of having a ‘colonial mindset’, ratcheting up the potential for conflict.

Like Egypt, other major African nations are also downstream countries in their regions. South Africa is downstream of Lesotho on the Senqu-Orange River. South Africa and Lesotho have the troubled origins of an unequal partnership, which to some degree continues.

The original 1986 treaty was signed by PW Botha’s apartheid government and Lesotho’s newly installed military government under General Justin Lekhanya. The general had removed prime minister Joseph Leabua Jonathan, who had opposed the Lesotho Highlands project, in what was called a ‘water coup.’

From those controversial beginnings, the parties developed one of the most sophisticated and better functioning transboundary water governance systems in the world – the Orange-Senqu River Basin Commission.

In Nigeria, the Niger River flows through hostile upstream neighbours in the form of Mali and Niger before pouring into the sea in the conflict-ridden Niger Delta. The Niger River lacks an equivalent water governance mechanism and is therefore arguably at a higher risk, similar to Egypt.

In a world dominated by a national security-first paradigm, water security is paramount. Climate change is a major threat multiplier, and the current lethargy on climate action investment is set to increase risk levels. Upstream activism could easily reset centuries-old power balances, which in some cases could be catastrophic for downstream players.

Sincere and highly functional cooperation agreements are key. They require infrastructure investment that promotes water sharing and energy beneficiation for mutual development, peace and security.

Written by Dhesigen Naidoo, Research Associate, Climate Risk and Human Security Project, ISS Pretoria