The American operation exposes the risks to Africa posed by AFRICOM’s push for relevance under Trump’s second term.

On Christmas night 2025, the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) launched airstrikes in Sokoto State, northwest Nigeria, targeting what it described as Islamic State terrorists. AFRICOM said the operation was coordinated with Nigeria.

However, US President Donald Trump framed the strikes as an attempt to stop the (debunked) ‘Christian genocide’ taking place in the country – a claim that had earlier led him to threaten Nigeria with sanctions and military action.

The US emphasis on Islamic State and Christian persecution doesn’t match Nigeria’s security threats. There are also concerns about civilian casualties in Sokoto, the use of poor intelligence and America’s true intentions. And by contradicting its stance against foreign military intervention, Nigeria has increased the risk of political and sectarian strife.

Sokoto is an overwhelmingly Muslim-majority state, as are the casualties of attacks there, mainly by armed criminal gangs or bandits. None of the locations targeted by the strikes were affected by Islamic State-related activity.

Site of US airstrikes in Sokoto State, Nigeria

The strikes mainly hit Bauni Forest on the Niger border, a base for Lakurawa, a cross-border jihadi-criminal group that is not an Islamic State affiliate. It is operationally linked to Boko Haram’s JAS (Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad) faction, a rival to Islamic State West Africa Province.

Another impact site, Jabo, has no documented terrorist presence or history of violent activity. This raised concerns, particularly among Muslims, that innocent communities were affected. Nigerian political officials said Jabo was hit by debris rather than a deliberate strike. However security officials framed this explanation as damage control for a possible US targeting error linked to poor or misapplied intelligence.

It’s possible that the US deliberately labelled the targets as Islamic State to fit a political narrative at home. This ties into Trump’s earlier accusation of ‘Christian genocide’ – much like his ‘white genocide in South Africa’ claims in mid-2025. Allegations about both countries have been thoroughly debunked, but could resonate among evangelical and conservative US constituencies.

Such narratives could endanger fragile security situations in Africa and fuel sectarian tensions, especially in places like Nigeria, with a history of ethno-religious distrust and violence. They can also alienate local communities, who are vital for intelligence and counter-terrorism cooperation.

Nigeria’s endorsement of the strikes was a departure from its posture against foreign combat operations on its soil. For years, Abuja received only training and equipment from foreign countries. The aim was to preserve its sovereignty and avoid a backlash, especially in the Muslim-majority north, which is often suspicious of Western intervention. But those concerns lessened as insecurity deepened, even among Muslims. Before the airstrikes, many Christians in Nigeria supported an American intervention.

Growing US pressure and threats of unilateral strikes and sanctions left Abuja with few choices. Rejecting the strikes could have reinforced the impression in Washington – and among some Christians at home – that Abuja was obstructing the protection of Christians, inviting diplomatic and economic repercussions. It might also have portrayed Nigeria’s government as impotent if the US operations proceeded regardless.

Nigeria's intelligence sharing ahead of the strikes appears to have been limited, but officials were pragmatic. They accepted America’s globally familiar ‘Islamic State’ messaging, saying the inclusion of local threats in this narrative was ‘handy strategic mistranslation’ as long as bad actors got hit and ties with America improved.

The Sokoto strikes were part of AFRICOM’s broader push for relevance under Trump’s second term. Under the previous administration, US influence declined after Niger’s junta asked it to withdraw from Niger Air Base 201 in 2024. The sprawling facility served as America’s hub for drones and surveillance operations in the Sahel, where Russia is expanding its influence.

In November 2025, the US moved assets to Accra, Ghana, from where contractor-operated surveillance flights operate over the Lake Chad area, aiding in offensives against Boko Haram in Nigeria’s Borno State. In February, the US confirmed troop deployments to Nigeria, with limited details about size and scope from either government.

January’s AFRICOM security cooperation talks with the Democratic Republic of the Congo coincided with the US State Department’s re-engagement with Mali in the Sahel. Relations there had deteriorated amid the junta’s pivot towards Russia for security. In Somalia, AFRICOM has conducted at least 23 strikes targeting al-Shabaab and Islamic State since 1 January, a rate outpacing US operations in previous years.

After the Nigerian strikes, AFRICOM – which has greater autonomy over such operations under US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth – stated publicly that America intended to get ‘a lot more aggressive’ kinetically in Africa. The Sokoto operation in Africa’s largest nation, and one badly affected by insecurity, was a signal of the US’ decision to reassert its military relevance on the continent.

But choosing Sokoto – not Borno, the main location of Islamic State terrorism, or Benue, Plateau or northern Adamawa, where Christian communities have faced attacks – forced Nigeria to accept domestic political risks.

Sokoto is a symbolically sensitive area – the seat of the Sultan, the head of Nigerian Muslims. Many perceived the strikes, especially the impact in Jabo, as anti-Islam amid US accusations of Christian persecution. That prompted Nigerian ministers to quickly emphasise that there was no religious motivation and that Jabo was hit by debris.

On the ground, Lakurawa suffered losses, with local sources telling the Institute for Security Studies that over 100 of its fighters died. Yet the group has since intensified attacks on civilians, suggesting that a temporary disruption without sustained Nigerian operations won’t be effective.

Questions remain about sovereignty and equality in US-Africa security partnerships, as well as about how foreign interventions not attuned to local contexts can backfire on affected African countries and communities.

To mitigate risks, African nations must ensure decisions are made using local intelligence and that ownership of joint operations is truly shared. Regional cooperation must be improved, and reliable external partnerships formed that better align with long-term goals of development and stability. This will reduce vulnerability to unilateral pressures, such as sanctions or conditional interventions.

Written by Taiwo Adebayo, Researcher, Lake Chad Basin, ISS