The formation of a government of national unity (GNU) could, in the coming decade, become a more common approach to address complex governance issues and power-sharing arrangements across the African continent. The experiment with this model in South Africa is being closely watched by other African countries grappling with deep-seated political, ethnic and ideological divisions, and the need for more inclusive, collaborative governance frameworks.

The major concern with GNU arrangements in Africa will be ensuring their stability and effectiveness in promoting inclusive economic growth. To achieve such stability, simply enacting strong coalition legislation is not enough — consideration must also be given to the creation of an effective, multi-stakeholder risk management committee to complement the legislative framework.  

Mandate of risk management committee

In the South African context, a GNU risk management committee would have to be established either by the GNU members themselves or as a multi-stakeholder initiative coordinated by civil society. We should assume that the major political parties in South Africa have their own internal risk management mechanisms to guide them on the risks associated with the evolving political landscape and the GNU. To ensure the GNU’s success, while retaining these internal mechanisms, it would be beneficial for all GNU members to collaborate and create a joint risk management committee.

Unlike the “the deadlock clearing committee” envisaged in the unity government’s statement of intent, the GNU risk body would have a forward-looking, proactive mandate.  Drawing from best practices in corporate risk management, its role would be to proactively assess the evolving political landscape, anticipate developments that could potentially trigger major fallouts and ruptures among the GNU partners, and then advise GNU partners on appropriate mitigation measures.

There are six key risk areas that would need attention if South Africa, and other African countries, decide to set up such risk management committees: leadership changes within the coalition parties,  policy agreements, failure to manage political rivalries in the elections happening during and at the end of GNU tenure, tensions over cabinet appointments and dismissals; the impact that the political parties outside the GNU have on the country’s political landscape, and the impact of the contest between China and USA for the control of Africa’s resources and markets.

A common thread across these five risk factors is that they cannot be remedied by coalition legislation alone. They require political solutions, and a risk management committee would be well-positioned to provide in-depth analysis and advise the GNU members on appropriate politically-grounded remedies.

Managing leadership change

The risk management approach is crucial in the context of leadership changes within the dominant parties that make up the GNU or grand coalition. As seen in other countries, shifts in party leadership can destabilise a coalition when the affected member is embroiled in intense factional battles and divergent views on whether to remain part of the coalition.

In South Africa, President Cyril Ramaphosa's last term as ANC president is set to end in 2027. This transition holds the potential to impact the political landscape, depending on how it is managed. If the GNU were to establish a risk management body, one of its responsibilities would be to carefully analyse various scenarios surrounding this leadership change. There are two possible scenarios.

One scenario is Ramaphosa serving out the remainder of his term.  Should this occur, it could lead to further scenarios: a positive, collaborative relationship between the new ANC leader and Ramaphosa as the country's president, or a contentious relationship between the two centers of power, leading to a debilitating power struggle within the ANC and paralysis in the GNU.

Alternatively, Ramaphosa could be recalled by the ANC prior to the end of his tenure as the country’s president. Here too, there are two further scenarios. If Ramaphosa is recalled, the parliament would have to elect a new president. In such a process, the ANC could present for nomination a presidential candidate who lacks broad support from other GNU stakeholders, or one capable of garnering cooperation across the GNU members. 

Either scenario would present unique challenges for maintaining stability and progress within the GNU. By examining the likelihood and associated risks of each scenario, the GNU's risk management committee could provide invaluable guidance to the alliance's members, enabling them to develop contingency plans and mitigation strategies, better positioning the GNU to navigate the turbulent waters of a critical leadership transition with stability and effectiveness.  The ANC’s fortunes or misfortunes in the 2026 local government elections have the potential to shape the ANC’s succession battle and Ramaphosa’s level of influence in the post-2026 ANC. This would have to be factored in any scenario analysis.

Navigating election-related risks 

A risk committee could also assess the election-related risks facing the GNU and advise the members on how to mitigate them. This would be important when the country holds the 2026 local government elections, which will serve as a litmus test for the major parties — the ANC, DA, MKP, EFF -— with high stakes and significant implications. In relation to the GNU stability, the electoral rivalry to watch is that between the ANC and DA.

The ANC, still reeling from the loss of political dominance in the May 2024 elections, will likely view the 2026 local polls as an opportunity to regain some semblance of political hegemony that it has enjoyed since 1994. Conversely, the DA will seek to further erode the ANC's power, hoping to solidify its position as a viable alternative. This dynamic will, in the run-up to the elections, set the stage for a highly charged and contentious campaign that would pit the two GNU partners against each other. It will be crucial for both the ANC and DA to strike a balance between shoring up electoral support from their hardline constituencies, some of whom believe that the GNU was a betrayal of their parties’ core values, and maintaining the spirit of civility essential for the GNU to function effectively.

If a risk committee is established within the GNU, it would be tasked with monitoring the developments in the contentious electoral politics and providing early warning signals to both parties when issues arise that threaten the GNU’s cohesion. Following the 2026 polls, the replication of the GNU model in strategic municipalities could be a means of preserving overall stability and ensuring the continued cohesion of the GNU.

Preventing major policy fallout 

The ANC and the DA hold deep ideological and policy differences over critical issues such as the NHI, land reform, the Basic Education Laws Amendment (Bela) Bill and preferred procurement. This raises the risk of debilitating policy "fallouts" that could paralyze the GNU. The GNU statement of intent envisages the establishment of “deadlock-breaking mechanisms” to resolve these conflicts, but some in the ANC have dismissed this as an attempt to create a “parallel cabinet.”

Policy experts have proposed a more pragmatic approach. They suggest the GNU parties first identify areas of policy convergence and divergence. For divergent policies, the parties should identify those policies where the parties can make a compromise and arrive at some unified position and those where a compromise is impossible. In the latter, the ANC and DA should employ a “trade-off approach” to manage the differences.

If the GNU were to adopt this approach, a risk committee could facilitate the process and, further, serve as a deadlock-breaking mechanism, when needed. This would help prevent major policy fallouts that could undermine the GNU's stability and effectiveness.

Beyond the policy conflicts, simmering tensions exist over the handling of cabinet ministers or senior officials accused of corruption or racism. Current and future court cases between the DA and the ANC also contribute to these simmering tensions. While not catastrophic on their own, these ongoing tensions could cumulatively test the coalition's resilience, even if they do not directly trigger its collapse.

Risk managing political landscape and “political fears”

Fear and anxiety often influence the behaviour of political parties. For example, the ANC, DA, and EFF are uncertain whether the MKP will gain more ground and repeat the electoral upsets seen in the May 2024 elections.  This uncertainty creates anxiety and leads to political repositioning as parties try to cope and risk-manage their anxieties.  It is unclear whether this anxiety will lead the ANC and EFF to form a behind-the-scenes alliance ahead of the 2026 election, or if it could push the ANC to incorporate the EFF into the GNU, isolating MKP politically but at the same time potentially upsetting the DA and disrupting the current GNU stability.

In coalition politics, there is also what can be called an "alternative fear complex," where parties fear arrangements alternative to the existing GNU. In South Africa, this is in some way manifested in the DA fearing the possibility of the political landscape shifting and creating an ANC-EFF-MKP alliance, which would then disrupt the current GNU arrangement, and create a difficult political environment for the DA’s vision of weakening ANC’s dominance.  

Conversely, the ANC fears the possibility of being left politically isolated if the landscape were to become dominated by two possible alliances - the EFF-MKP alliance and a DA-led alliance that essentially revives “the multiparty charter to rescue South Africa.”  

The current GNU or grand coalition has provided both the ANC and DA a coping mechanism to address their "alternative fear complexes" and avoid the alternative scenarios they dread. However, it is unclear to what extent these political fears will compel the ANC and DA to maintain their alliance and prevent the collapse of the GNU, even as the broader political landscape evolves.

If the GNU had a risk assessment body, it would have helped the GNU partners with scenario analysis of the country’s political landscape, how the various fears and anxieties influence such a political landscape, and then propose effective mitigation measures.  

It is all about political maturity and the common good

Ultimately, though, the pragmatism and political maturity of the GNU partners themselves will remain a crucial determinant. As long as the need to serve the greater good of the nation outweighs narrow party interests, and the members demonstrate the flexibility and creativity needed to find solutions to various risks and deadlocks, the GNU arrangement stands a chance of weathering South Africa’s evolving political landscape and its inherent challenges.

Rigorous risk management will be a vital complement, but it is the partners' political maturity that will truly underpin the success or failure of the complex power sharing arrangements. It is the same political maturity that will enable the country to risk-manage its GNU in a manner that secures a stable, prosperous, and equitable future for all South Africans.

Written by Father Stan Muyebe, director of the Justice and Peace Commission of the Southern African Catholic Bishops’ Conference