Africa is assessing the impact of the recent conflict on African economic and security interests, which have been thrown into confusion by a clash between its two allies, Iran and Israel. Although neither country has a strong presence in Africa, both wish for closer ties. Those ambitions are on hold as their military confrontation continues.

A surprise Israeli attack on Iranian military and nuclear facilities on 13 June 2025 began the latest Middle East escalation. Iran responded with drone and missile attacks that managed to penetrate Israel’s defence shields and claimed multiple lives. Ceasefire pacts have been broken, and there is no end in sight for hostilities. As with any international conflict, nations far away from the theatre of battle consider the economic and diplomatic toll they might possibly encounter. For Africa, energy and shipping considerations are the foremost concerns.

North Africa closely monitors Middle East conflicts

There is a common-interest bloc comprised of countries from the Middle East and North Africa called MENA, sending the Middle East’s reach all the way across Africa to the Atlantic Ocean. Despite those ties, the impact of the conflict varies from one North African country to another.

Egypt has suffered the greatest from the outbreak of hostilities between Iran and Israel. Israel immediately shut down its Karish and Leviathan gas fields as a security precaution. These fields supplied 20% of Egypt’s gas needs, and without this supply, a return to severe electricity blackouts across Egypt seems imminent. Additionally, this brings a return to economic and social tension that threatened the government of President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in 2024.

Iran’s export of radical Islam is considered destabalising by many African governments, particularly Egypt. Consequently, Cairo has increased ties with Israel. Israel has also been engaged in diplomatic outreach into Sub-Saharan Africa. Well ahead of Iran, Israel and other MENA countries (Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the UAE) have increased their economic and diplomatic presence in Africa. Comparatively, only the heads of states of three African nations – Ghana, South Africa, and Zimbabwe – have visited Tehran.

Libya and Tunisia have insignificant ties with Israel and Iran and will experience neither benefit nor harm if either side emerges the victor. On the other hand, Algeria stands to gain a more powerful ally if Iran should win the conflict, while Morocco would see a more formidable adversary. Iran has chosen sides in the independence of Western Sahara, which Morocco claims is its own territory. Iran has shown interest in the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, Western Sahara’s independence party, and the Polisario Front, the politico-military Western Saharan organisation backed by Algeria. Historically, Algeria has opposed Israel’s policies in the region, particularly their attendance to any pan-African forum. This is an Algerian stance that has intensified since Israel deepened its ties with Morocco following the Abraham Accords that formalised diplomatic ties between the two nations.

For now, Iran’s conflict with Israel absorbs all its attention and resources. Over the past two decades, Morocco has solidified its hold on Western Sahara, thanks to diplomatic successes with African and other nations on the issue. That could change. For five months in 2018, Morocco broke diplomatic ties with Iran in protest of their support of a Polisario Front uprising.

Elsewhere in Africa, agendas are restructuring

Other than the MENA countries, the effect of the Iran-Israel conflict on the rest of Africa has been the fear of the destabilising influences this conflict could have. However, many of these fears have not come to pass.

Economically, fears of substantial rises in the cost of oil have not materialised. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries announced on 5 July 2025 a production increase to stabilise prices. A possibility that Israel’s assets in Eritrea and US military assets in Djibouti could be attacked by Iranian proxies has also not occurred. Shipping of African cargo through the Red Sea has not been affected, unlike during the Israel-Hamas War in 2023 when shipping was sometimes indiscriminately targeted by pro-Iranian militias. Food supplies, aid and commerce have not been disrupted either.

Data source: OPEC, 2025

The foremost impact has been on diplomacy. African governments are assessing their relationships with Iran and Israel, while those two countries find their diplomatic overtures into Africa stalled for the hostilities’ duration. Israel has diplomatic ties with twice the number of African countries as Iran: 40 to Iran’s 20.

Most African countries severed diplomatic ties with Israel in 1973 during the Yom Kippur War and only re-established these through a concerted effort from Jerusalem during the past 15 years. Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Rwanda and Togo were Israel’s closest allies. However, since Israel’s war with Hamas in 2023, Africa’s popular pro-Palestine sentiments, in which in the eyes of the Palestinian people is seen as a liberation struggle similar to Africa’s own anti-colonial wars, Israel’s prestige and influence in Africa has diminished. Indicative of Israel’s strained stature in Africa is South Africa’s laying of charges at the International Court of Justice against Israel for Crimes against Humanity for alleged Israeli abuses against Palestinian civilians during Israel’s ongoing conflict with Hamas.

Iran has opened Shiite religious and cultural centres in Comoros, Djibouti, Nigeria, Senegal and Tanzania. Iran’s main economic investment focus has been on the mining of uranium to create weapons-grade plutonium. Such initiatives are on pause during the conflict with Israel.

Of all sub-regions, Iran values Eastern Africa the most for its proximity to MENA and sees the strategic importance of these countries that border the Red Sea. Iran has few ties with other continents, making Africa the best place to expand its global influence. However, Iran has always had an ad hoc country-by-country approach to Africa and has never developed a comprehensive Africa policy that articulates its goals on the continent or how these could be achieved.

Iran and Niger, for instance, signed a co-operation agreement in April 2025, which suggests that Iran wishes to capitalise on the expulsion of France from its former colonies Burkina Faso, Chad and Niger. Such ambitions can only be guessed at though as no formal statements have been made. However, movement to do more in the Western Sahel, from investment to military training, has slowed. The Iran-Israel conflict is draining the resources of both countries that might have been committed to Africa.

The critical points:

• Iran-Israel hostilities have not caused major disruptions in Africa
• Iran’s desire to seek influence on the continent has suffered from a haphazard approach, resulting in its only having 20 diplomatic missions in Africa, compared with Israel’s 40
• Israel lost widespread support from its African allies, who chose to support their opponent in the Israel-Palestinian conflict

Written by In On Africa