In a recent judgment, the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) reaffirmed the legal principles governing the withdrawal of admissions in pleadings and the setting aside of compromise agreements. In Road Accident Fund v Sarah Wilson Lewis ([2025] ZASCA 174), the SCA confirmed the stringent requirements courts impose to protect the integrity of the litigation process when considering whether the Road Accident Fund (RAF) could retract from a prior compromise and amend its plea to withdraw an admission of causation, years after the litigation had reached trial readiness.

The dispute arose from a claim brought by the claimant, Sarah Lewis, following the death of her husband in a motor vehicle accident in 2006. The RAF initially admitted liability for 100% of proven damages and settled certain heads of claim based on the evidence of an expert witness who the parties jointly appointed and where there was expert consensus that the claimant had suffered a psychiatric injury causally linked to the accident. The RAF admitted liability for 100% of the claimant's proven or agreed damages, including general damages and medical expenses based on her psychiatric injury.

However, after appointing a new expert, Dr Khan, and receiving her reports, the RAF sought to withdraw the compromise and attempted to amend its plea to deny that the claimant had suffered a psychiatric injury caused by the accident, to argue that there was no causal link between her mental state and the collision, and to assert that she retained residual earning capacity.

The RAF argued that the settlement was actuated by a common incorrect assumption of fact, namely that the respondent’s psychiatric condition was accident related. It contended that this mistake rendered the compromise voidable and justified the withdrawal of its admission. The RAF further maintained that the new expert opinion introduced a fresh defence not previously available.

The court rejected these arguments. The court held that the compromise was based on extensive expert consensus at the time, including joint minutes between psychiatrists and psychologists on both sides. The later emergence of a contrary opinion did not retrospectively render the original assumption incorrect, nor did it amount to a mutual mistake. To hold otherwise would undermine the finality of settlements and destabilise judicial case management.

Turning to the proposed amendment, the court emphasised that amendments seeking to withdraw admissions are subject to more rigorous scrutiny. While amendments are generally allowed to ensure proper ventilation of disputes, applications to withdraw admissions are treated with greater caution. Such amendments require a bona fide explanation and must not cause prejudice that cannot be cured by a costs order or other procedural protections. In this case, the RAF’s application was found to lack bona fides (in good faith) and would cause significant prejudice to the claimant, who had relied on the admission and prepared her case accordingly and was not in a position to re-litigate the issue of causation. The timing after trial readiness and years of litigation further compounded the prejudice.

The judgment emphasises that compromise agreements are not lightly set aside. A party cannot escape a valid settlement by pointing to a later-disproved belief or a new expert opinion. Similarly, amendments involving withdrawal of admissions demand compelling justification and will not be granted where they introduce uncertainty on issues long considered settled.

Exceptional circumstances must be shown, signifying a real risk of grave injustice. A change in litigation strategy or dissatisfaction with earlier expert consensus does not meet this standard. Reconsideration is not a mechanism for a “third bite at the cherry” but an extraordinary remedy reserved for truly deserving cases.

Compromise remains a cornerstone of civil litigation, promoting certainty and efficiency. Parties should approach settlements with diligence and recognise that courts will enforce them strictly. Attempts to withdraw admissions or undo compromises without exceptional justification will fail. The RAF judgment is a timely reminder that litigation strategy cannot be rewritten at the eleventh hour.

Written by Rethabile Shabalala, Senior Associate & Maano Manavhela, Associate at Webber Wentzel