There have also been reports of advanced discussions to have Turkey set up a missile and rocket testing site in Somalia.

These agreements underscore Turkey’s strategic and economic aspirations in the broader Horn of Africa region.

Over the past four years, there has been a steady increase in Turkish partnerships and agreements for the export of defence-related products to the region. This has included the use of Turkish drones in conflict zones, such as Libya and Ethiopia.

I have studied Turkey’s historical and current involvement in Somalia to understand what’s driving Ankara’s policy in the Horn of Africa. In my view, Turkey’s involvement is driven by multiple factors. These include international status-seeking, regional balance and strategic concerns.

The opening of a training facility in Mogadishu has increased Turkey’s strategic depth in the Horn of Africa, projecting the country towards both sub-Saharan Africa and the Indian Ocean. And the use of Turkish drones in Ethiopia’s Tigray conflict has shown Turkish defence arrangements have become a factor in local dynamics.

Somalia’s appeal

Turkey’s interest in Somalia dates back to 2010-2011. At the time, Somalia was grappling with the devastating effects of 20 years of civil war, failed international interventions and the emergence of the al-Qaeda-linked al-Shabaab terror group. In addition, the country was devastated by a famine that claimed more than 250 000 lives.

Somalia presented Turkey with several opportunities to establish a footprint in a region of high geostrategic value, and to enhance its image in Africa and globally.

First, there was a lack of interest in the country from major international players. Apart from anti-piracy initiatives in the Gulf of Aden and the US focus on the war on terror, international players watched Somalia with a certain detachment.

Turkey saw an opportunity to benefit from taking a leading role in an international crisis scenario.

Second, the world’s attention focused on the Arab world. The region was facing a wave of pro-democracy protests dubbed the Arab Spring. Somalia and the suffering of the Somali people were quickly forgotten by the international community.

Turkish policymakers saw the country’s isolation as an opportunity to gain international popularity and visibility on the continent.

Turkey took a multifaceted approach in Somalia. This encompassed humanitarian aid, diplomatic initiatives and economic investment. Turkey also supported state-building efforts and the reconstruction of Somalia’s security apparatus.

Internal dynamics

The financial and political resources that Turkey has invested in Somalia are driven by regional and domestic political considerations.

Regionally, 2016 to 2021 was a period of tension between Turkey, and Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Somalia and the competition for influence in its politics became one of the main areas of confrontation.

Domestically, Turkey has been able to portray its involvement in a way that’s boosted the ruling party’s standing. In addition, engagement in the Horn of Africa meets the demands of various business groups. This includes construction and defence companies that are close to the ruling political elite.

Intervention in Somalia plays an important role in the narrative of Turkish political elites associated with Turkey’s ruling party, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party).

The party is a conservative but non-confessional party with Islamist roots. A significant proportion of the party’s supporters consider voluntary charity (sadaqa) to be the duty of a good Muslim. As a result, Turkey’s foreign and domestic interests converged with the government’s policy to support crisis-stricken Muslim communities. This includes those in Somalia. Here, Turkey has framed its involvement as a political and humanitarian success story. The Turkish public views it as such.

Turkey has been able to bolster its security and defence ties at a rapid pace. The country’s Savunma Sanayii Başkanlığı (Defence Industry Agency of Turkey) reports directly to the president. Established as a state body in 1985, the agency gained prominence in 2017 when President Recep Tayyip Erdogan had it placed under the direct authority of the presidency.

This has made concluding defence agreements – a key factor of Ankara’s foreign policy – much faster.

Turkey has also used the opportunity to increase its involvement in the energy sector. Ankara has long aspired to play a pivotal role as a major energy hub in the wider region. It has considered establishing exploration operations off the coast of Somalia. Like all emerging powers, Turkey has a thirst for energy. This explains its July 2024 oil and gas exploration deal with Somalia.

Turning point

Ankara’s February 2024 defence agreement marked a significant turning point in Turkey-Somalia cooperation.

The agreement deepens defence ties between the two countries. Under the deal, Turkey has agreed to train and equip the Somali navy. It will also help patrol Somalia’s extensive 3,333-kilometre coastline. Turkey’s focus is on maritime activities. This is a strategic choice largely influenced by the unstable conditions in Somalia, where exerting control over territory is difficult.

The deal is a response to changes in the regional landscape and the ongoing reconfiguration of power dynamics in the Horn of Africa.

This has included:

• a January 2024 agreement between Ethiopia and Somaliland, a breakaway state of Somalia, for access to the Red Sea. The deal renewed tensions between Addis Ababa and Mogadishu.

• the presence of Egyptian troops in Somalia, which Turkey is watching with a mixture of concern and irritation

• the strengthening of al-Shabaab’s position

• the participation of Ethiopian troops in the new African Union stabilisation mission in Somalia

• an upcoming election in Somaliland.

Somalia’s decision to pursue diplomatic ties and defence agreements with Turkey needs to be understood against this backdrop.

Written by Federico Donelli, Assistant Professor of International Relations, University of Trieste

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.