Operational constraints and regional tensions prevent the UN peacekeeping mission from responding effectively to escalating violence.

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has renewed its Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) mission’s mandate until 20 December 2026 amid ongoing clashes in the country’s east.

Since the escalation of violence a year ago, over 7 000 deaths have been documented in the three eastern provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri. The region also suffers systematic and large-scale sexual violence, the forced recruitment of children, and obstacles to delivering much-needed humanitarian aid.

Globally, UN peacekeeping missions are up against geopolitical tensions and fragile support, creating a gap between capabilities and expectations. It’s no different for the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO), which is entangled in the complex Great Lakes context.

Operational constraints and political complexities have drastically hampered MONUSCO’s mandate to protect civilians and stabilise the region. Violence between the national army and armed groups continues, and regional tensions have worsened despite various diplomatic initiatives.

The mission has become increasingly misaligned with realities on the ground. It should be assessed and adjusted to match current dynamics and the political and security climate of the DRC and Great Lakes.

The Congolese-UN 2023 transition plan, which envisaged a gradual withdrawal of the mission by December 2025, fell away when the security situation worsened in 2021. Escalating violence between the March 23 Movement (M23) and government-aligned forces in January 2025 fundamentally altered the conditions.

Eastern DRC has been a hotbed of crises for decades, fuelled by a weak state, corruption and a lack of territorial control. This is aggravated by regional actors’ involvement – notably neighbouring countries Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi – in an already over-militarised situation.

The UNSC has highlighted the support for M23 by Rwanda and, to a degree, Uganda, and the DRC’s support for the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda rebels. This has created an intractable regional security crisis that hinders any attempt at a peaceful resolution and undermines MONUSCO’s efforts to protect civilians.

Internally, the mission faces a lack of troop commitment and limited resources. DRC communities and politicians also criticise it for being ineffective against M23 and the Ugandan-originated Allied Democratic Forces.

This anti-MONUSCO sentiment has become a political lever in DRC. The mission is often blamed for the failures of the Congolese government and army, which bear primary responsibility for the security and protection of civilians.

Regional forces deployed to eastern DRC from East and Southern Africa have had to withdraw due to political divisions, limited resources and impossible mandates, with similar structural problems as MONUSCO.

M23’s gains highlight the constraints of an overly rigid and territorially limited mandate. MONUSCO replicates the general objectives of peacekeeping without sufficiently adapting to the DRC context. This, along with its expanding list of tasks, puts pressure on resources and results in a crisis of confidence.

The mission’s operations are also limited to within the DRC, although the conflict is characterised by armed groups that act across borders. Peacekeeping in DRC is also uncoordinated and fragmented due to a lack of joint planning and competition among international actors. Poor intelligence sharing creates operational gaps that armed groups can exploit.

These limitations result in reactive responses that favour defensive rather than offensive actions, restricting MONUSCO’s capacity to protect civilians, despite blatant abuses on the ground.

The mission’s mandate must be adjusted in favour of greater flexibility, regional cooperation, more support for local forces, and clear criteria for withdrawal. The UNSC should define a robust and flexible plan incorporating improved intelligence sharing and adaptive rules of engagement, and develop a civil-military early warning mechanism in coordination with regional actors.

To neutralise aggressive armed factions, the mission’s Force Intervention Brigade needs a clear mandate and sufficient resources to avoid overstretching MONUSCO. Military engagement should target groups identified by regional consensus.

MONUSCO and the Congolese government must redefine a withdrawal and transition strategy based on assessment criteria and local preparedness, not fixed timelines. They must accelerate training and equipping the DRC army and police, with a focus on respecting human rights. An enforcement mechanism will be needed to prevent the DRC army’s complicity in human rights abuses.

For regional actors, MONUSCO must be anchored within a revitalised regional political strategy that focuses on diplomacy, mediation and coordinated sanctions, rather than merely deploying troops. Without this, the mission’s efforts will be paralysed in the face of an ever-dynamic political and security environment.

For more on this topic, click here to read our new policy brief: ‘Recalibrating MONUSCO: mandate limits vs. political realities in eastern DRC’

Written by Remadji Hoinathy, Senior Researcher, Central Africa and Lake Chad Basin, ISS & Nirvaly Mooloo, Research Officer, Central Africa and Lake Chad Basin, ISS