Given the grey area between policy and operations, transparency on the police minister’s directions to SAPS should be required.

Inappropriate political interference in the police and other criminal justice agencies has been a recurring concern in South Africa for many years. Allegations against suspended police minister Senzo Mchunu are now being examined by both the Madlanga Commission and a Parliamentary Ad Hoc Committee.

Mchunu allegedly tried to disrupt the investigation of criminals involved in funding his political campaigns by ordering the closure of the Political Killings Task Team. The task team was established in 2018 to investigate politically motivated murders in high-risk areas like KwaZulu-Natal province.

Along with questions about why he ordered the task team’s closure, the allegations raise the issue of how to limit improper interference in policing.

Section 207(2) of the country’s constitution authorises the minister to issue national policing policy and ‘directions’ to the South African Police Service (SAPS) National Commissioner. The minister’s role is to ensure that the elected government’s political mandate is translated into operational policing in line with constitutional principles. On that basis, the minister can set policy and priorities, and issue strategic directions to the National Commissioner.

Political interference is often intended to prevent politicians or their allies from standing trial for alleged crimes. During the state capture period, executive powers were repeatedly used to appoint personnel who protected the president or others from investigation and prosecution.

In 2012 allegations against then police minister, the late Nathi Mthethwa, included interference to shield politically aligned head of police crime intelligence, Richard Mdluli, from disciplinary measures. Similar recent testimony before the Madlanga Commission claimed that a former city manager obstructed disciplinary measures against a senior Ekurhuleni metropolitan police official linked to alleged organised crime kingpin Vusimuzi ‘Cat’ Matlala.

Inappropriate political influence over police may also be used to target adversaries. A court judgment found that in 2008, Mpumalanga premier David Mabuza ordered police to deny protection to someone with whom he was in conflict over a land matter. That case illustrates that improper influence over police is not confined to the police minister, and may include provincial or local government politicians. 

It is widely believed that to eliminate such political interference, the police minister must be authorised to issue policy but not intervene in operational policing. But this approach wrongly assumes that policy and operations are clearly distinct.

For example, a directive to focus police personnel on a specific crime problem – which may involve setting up or closing task teams – is simultaneously about operations and policy. Such a directive would have immediate operational consequences, including depriving other units, task teams or police stations of personnel. As it is linked to determining crime priorities, it is simultaneously about policy.

Police resources are often deployed in response to political influence, especially in setting up SAPS task teams and specialised units. This applies not only to the establishment of the Political Killings Task Team, but to the creation of task teams to combat economic-infrastructure crimes in 2022, and in the commitment of SAPS resources to address extortion.

Resourcing of Family Violence, Child Protection and Sexual Offences units – now an entrenched feature of the SAPS with 176 units in existence – is a consequence of political pressure on the police to improve services to victims.

For some, Mchunu’s directive to close the Political Killings Task Team exceeded his authority. Others argue that the primary irregularity was the absence of consultation, notably with National Commissioner Fannie Masemola. The failure to properly consider active task team investigations has also been criticised.

Political role players who seek to shut down investigative units may indeed have malign motivations. But the fact that Mchunu issued the directive in writing has enabled scrutiny of his actions. Improper influence is more likely to be exercised through verbal rather than written communication, since the former enables deniability.

In a submission to the Parliamentary Ad Hoc Committee, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) has argued that legislation should be passed to reduce the potential for improper interference. Rather than excluding the minister’s influence over valid policing matters, the ISS suggests that any direction from the minister should be given in writing and clearly motivated.

Such directions should also be preceded by consultation with the National Commissioner. After being issued, they should be presented for parliamentary scrutiny. This follows the approach recommended in the 2018 report of the panel of experts on professionalising the SAPS.

The ISS also argues that the law should specify a ‘minimum core’ of issues on which ministerial directions are prohibited, such as investigations of individual cases, managing public order situations, and appointing, promoting, disciplining or dismissing individual police officers.

The submission is guided by the approach followed in other countries. The Kenyan National Police Service Act, for example, requires that ministerial directions to the police be in writing. New Zealand and various Australian states have similar provisions in place.

Protecting police from inappropriate political interference is intended to support them in applying high standards of judgement based on the law and their professional expertise. At the same time, efforts to prevent the abuse of ministerial power should not exempt the police from legitimate executive authority. The danger lies in abuse, not the political direction itself.

Written by David Bruce, Independent Researcher and ISS Consultant