After nearly six decades of BDP rule, the triumphant UDC government has the tough task of restoring sound governance.

Botswana’s 30 October elections ushered in a new era for the country with an emphatic rejection of the ruling party – in power for almost six decades – and a resounding win for President Duma Boko’s Umbrella for Democratic Change (UDC).

The UDC won 36 out of 61 directly elected seats in Parliament, while the former ruling party, the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), won only four. Voter turnout was high at over 80%.

Although this represents a turning point in the country’s history, the dynamics surrounding the BDP’s defeat must be unpacked critically, not overlooked in the euphoria of change.

The BDP produced a poorly articulated manifesto that promised little change. Over the years, perceptions of BDP corruption and a lack of transparency have grown. In addition, key economic and social development indicators have recently been on a downward trajectory.

Unemployment has been rising, reaching 34% for youth. The country’s over-dependence on a single commodity – diamonds – without aggressive investment in other productive sectors has made it vulnerable to external economic shocks. Diamond prices have fallen, and Botswana’s gross domestic product has withered as a result.

Investment in social development such as quality affordable healthcare has dropped. The country has one of the highest maternal mortality rates among comparable upper middle-income countries, with 175 deaths per 100 000 live births. Inequality is also rising. Botswana is among Southern Africa’s most unequal countries, with a Gini coefficient of 0.53 – not far behind the world leader South Africa, at 0.67.

While the defeat was humiliating for the BDP, a closer look at the results highlights the challenges of Botswana’s first-past-the-post voting system. This system means that although the BDP garnered 30.49% of the popular vote to the UDC’s 37%, the BDP has only four seats in Parliament. As a result, large segments of the voting population are under-represented.

The first-past-the-post approach is structured via constituency representation rather than an overall proportional tally (as in South Africa, for example). So even if parties win large percentages of the collated votes, they don’t necessarily translate into individual constituency wins and parliamentary seats. Countries with such systems should consider introducing a hybrid approach that allows the popular vote to inform the allocation of seats in Parliament.

The results of Botswana’s popular vote show that the BDP still has a significant following and cannot be written out of the country’s politics.

At the same time, the UDC’s victory reflects both a well-articulated alternative and citizens’ disaffection with the old regime. The need to outperform the BDP may define the UDC during its term in office.

The opposition anchored its campaign promises on rebuilding the economy, creating sustainable employment and ending graft, which it said the BDP tolerated. Economic diversification would underpin an overhaul of the economy. Pledges to increase the minimum wage to BWP4 000 (US$300) inspired hope among voters. The UDC also promised to review the Constitution through a participatory and inclusive process.

The party’s biggest enemy will be high expectations after Boko’s many promises to the electorate. The new administration has just five years to redirect and re-energise an almost six-decade-old governance system. Politically astute strategic communication will be vital.

After taking power, most opposition parties soon realise that statecraft and running a government aren’t easy. With limited experience in governing, they face a steep learning curve as they get a firm grip on the state’s delivery mechanisms.

Boko and the UDC must also demonstrate that they can deliver on inclusion and representation, considering that only two out of 36 UDC parliamentarians were women. There are only six women out of a total of 69 parliamentarians. To his credit, Boko has already appointed numerous young people and women to his Cabinet, in line with UDC’s manifesto.

The party must now dismantle the institutions that allowed the BDP to consolidate power and dominate the political system. The UDC must institute comprehensive constitutional and electoral reforms to improve inclusivity and facilitate greater independence of the electoral commission to level the playing field.

The party’s victory could also have regional ramifications. The BDP’s loss might be part of a wider regional process, where former liberation ruling parties across Southern Africa are losing their grip on power.

The Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) openly declared it would do all it could to support the BDP during campaigning. This declaration shows how liberation movement solidarity has defined the Southern African Development Community’s (SADC) trajectory since its establishment, and likely influences its decision-making processes.

Already ZANU-PF and its supporters have started casting aspersions on Boko, labelling him a ‘Brenthurst Foundation project.’ Whether it’s the imperialist narrative from Zimbabwe or the ‘white monopoly capital’ tag from South Africa, the aim is the same – to delegitimise. Opposition parties that win elections threaten ruling party dominance, an existential reality in several Southern African countries.

Heads of state who came from the opposition benches are expected to align their positions with those of the liberation movements on SADC-level decisions. Recently, Zimbabwe’s administration has tried to isolate Zambia from Southern Africa because the governing party is not part of the liberation movement caucus that dominates SADC.

Instead of using the opportunity to engender generational learning and fuse the old with the new, the current trajectory could see the region divided between former liberation ruling parties and emerging political leaders.

Gradual as they may be, these power shifts present opportunities for SADC decision making and policy development to move away from dogma and towards pragmatic engagement with member states and the world.

As Botswana embarks on this new chapter, it must recognise that while opposition wins are often celebrated as victories for democracy, the real test lies in implementing effective governance reforms.

Ensuring stability, meeting the people’s demands, and fostering economic inclusion will determine whether the UDC can indeed offer a transformative alternative – or if Botswana will witness yet another cycle of political disillusionment.

Written by Tunji Namaiko, Consultant, Southern Africa, ISS Pretoria & Ringisai Chikohomero, Researcher, Southern Africa, ISS Pretoria