As delays fuel public concerns, the government and ECOWAS must turn political will into action with the help of international partners.

The Gambia’s July protests against alleged corruption linked to the sale of former president Yahya Jammeh’s assets show that citizens are committed to justice and transparency. Initiated by the Gambians Against Looted Assets movement, the demonstrations took place as victims of Jammeh’s 1994-2017 regime and their families continue to demand reparations.

The protests stem from an atmosphere of apprehension following the work of the Truth, Reconciliation and Reparations Commission (TRRC) between 2017 and 2021. Nearly four years since it ended, most of the TRRC’s recommendations are yet to be implemented, raising questions about the challenges of completing the transitional justice process.

According to figures released by The Gambia’s National Human Rights Commission in May 2025, only 60 of the 304 activities (representing the TRRC’s 263 recommendations), had been fully implemented. Of the remaining 244 activities, 143 are ongoing and 101 are yet to be started.

The right to justice and the duty of accountability were, however, declared priorities by the government. The White Paper on implementing the TRRC’s recommendations calls for the prosecution of those accused of abuses, and the compensation of victims of Jammeh’s regime. It also calls for a special tribunal, the creation of which was endorsed by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in December 2024.

This decision was preceded by the adoption of a law in 2023 establishing a fund to compensate victims of abuses and human rights violations, in line with the TRRC’s recommendations. Members of the commission responsible for administering the fund have been appointed, but operational constraints and insufficient financial resources impede progress.

In 2024, two more laws were passed. One establishes a Special Accountability Mechanism and the other creates the Special Prosecutor’s Office, tasked with investigating and prosecuting crimes committed during Jammeh’s regime. The latter will collaborate with the Special Tribunal for The Gambia, which will handle the most serious cases and those involving international crimes. The Special Criminal Division of the High Court will address lesser domestic offences.

These developments reflect genuine institutional commitment. However, the lack of funding, dependence on external aid, and political uncertainties threaten the continuity of the process.

Among the main challenges is securing funding for the tribunal’s operations, which the justice minister estimates requires around US$60-million over five years. The United States (US), particularly through the US Agency for International Development, USAID and European Union have been the main contributors to the transitional process. The closure of USAID and realignment of foreign aid are partly responsible for the noticeable slowdown in The Gambia’s implementation of its transitional justice commitments.

Thus far, ECOWAS’ endorsement of The Gambia’s efforts does not include financial support. But given the country’s heavy dependence on external funding, the regional organisation could become a crucial lever for mobilising funds from international donors.

The meeting in Abuja this October between ECOWAS and Gambian authorities was an important step in this direction. It showed a shared commitment to fully implement transitional justice and represents an opportunity for ECOWAS to reaffirm its role in establishing the Special Tribunal – not only technically, but also financially.

For its part, the Gambian government should actively mobilise internal resources to achieve concrete progress in the transitional justice process. Using the money from the sale of Jammeh’s assets to accelerate implementation would serve as a powerful demonstration of political will, and would help secure international backing.

Institute for Security Studies research in The Gambia has shown the need for effective government communication to manage citizens’ growing frustration, particularly among victims of Jammeh’s regime. This would ensure transparency between citizens and the state, bridging the gap that has widened between the two parties, which is a core requirement of the transitional context.

Adding to these challenges is the looming 2026 presidential election. Many fear that other priorities will overshadow the transitional justice agenda. These include immediate socioeconomic and governance concerns, which are likely to attract more debate than long-term goals, such as transitional justice.

The political alliance between President Adama Barrow’s National People’s Party and a faction of Jammeh’s Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction also sparked significant controversy. The continued presence in government of individuals whom the TRRC found responsible for abuses and violence, despite the adoption of a law prohibiting such appointments, further reinforces concerns.

While there is broad national consensus on the need for transitional justice, the Gambian government must keep the process at the centre of its national agenda. It stands as a barometer of national will to not only end impunity, but also strengthen the rule of law and national cohesion.

In a regional context marked by widespread human rights violations, the success of The Gambian transitional justice process would send a powerful signal for accountability and establish a concrete regional model for tackling impunity.

Written by Aïssatou Kanté, Researcher, Littoral West African States, ISS Regional office for West Africa and the Sahel; Fatoumatta Badjie, Junior Fellow, ISS Regional office for West Africa and the Sahel; Paulin Maurice Toupane, Senior Researcher, Regional Office for West Africa and the Sahel