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[1]          “If the new Constitution is a bridge away from a culture of authority, it is clear what it must be a bridge to.  It must lead to a culture of justification – a culture in which every exercise of power is expected to be justified; in which leadership given by government rest on the cogency of the case offered in defence of its decisions, not the fair inspired by the force at its command.  The new order must be a community built on persuasion not coercion”.[1]

[2]          In one paragraph South Africa’s finest academic public lawyer of his generation Professor Mureinik captured the very essence of the legal principles upon which our Constitution rested.  The exercise of power was required to be justified by reasoned argument.  Over the past 30 years of constitutional democracy it is apparent that our jurisprudence has sought to vindicate this idea not only insofar as the executive is concerned but also, in appropriate circumstances, when Parliament exercises powers granted to it by the Constitution.  Thus in Mazibuko N.O v Sisulu and others NNO 2013 (6) SA 249 (CC) the majority of the Court by way of the judgment of Moseneke DCJ  held that the Court had jurisdiction to examine the constitutionality of the Rules of the National Assembly, holding, in effect, that Chapter 12 thereof was constitutionally invalid to the extent of not providing for a constitutional right to be exercised; in this case the right of a member of the National Assembly to move a motion of no confidence in the President within a reasonable time.

[3]          The present case before this Court requires consideration of these principles.  It turns on the extent to which the judicial power of review should be exercised over powers granted to and exercised by the National Assembly.  In short, the central question raised in this dispute is to what extent Parliament is entitled to decide whether a member of Parliament is in contempt of Parliament or whether that power should be circumscribed to ensure the introduction of an independent third party to play an investigating role in the determination of whether a member of Parliament is in contempt of Parliament.  Hence this Court is confronted with the following question:  To what extent does the culture of justification require an intervention from this Court insofar as the parliamentary disciplinary process of a Member of Parliament is concerned?