The implications of the second Trump presidency – Trump 2.0 – is debated across the world.

Many observers are hoping that Trump 2.0 will improve the fortunes of some countries, and end the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East. Others fear it will cause major disruptions.

There is fear among some African observers that Trump will reduce US interest in the continent, as was the case during his first term.

Based on our ongoing research at the University of Pretoria’s African Centre for the Study of the US, we argue that Trump 2.0 could be a mixed bag, holding both promise and fear for Africa.

For example, a transactional approach to foreign engagement, and his preference for selective bilateral relations based on US strategic needs, could be positive for foreign relations, investment and trade with some African countries.

But it might also endanger African agency and voices in global affairs. It could be bad for democracy, stability, commitment to human rights and climate change. It might also negatively affect African immigration to the US.

America first policy

Trump’s America-first policy orientation means that interests and commitments to other countries and international affairs are secondary. Relations are based on their benefits to the US. Hence, US foreign policy interests and engagements would be tied to strategic security and economic demands.

This is a challenge for African countries with limited strategic importance to the US. For example, during Trump’s first term, (2017-2021), the US indicated interest in bilateral trade deals rather than the African Growth and Opportunity Act (Agoa). The act grants duty-free access to the US market for certain products from eligible African countries.

This will negatively affect countries benefiting from Agoa. It might benefit those that manage to secure deals with his administration. But it could also lead to fragmentation in US-Africa trade relations, hurting smaller economies with less bargaining power.

Immigration

Another area of concern for many in Africa is Trump’s proposed strict immigration policy. It will tighten the border and deport illegal immigrants. This could make even legitimate African immigration to the US difficult. About 3-million of the 19-million African emigrants between 1990 and 2020 went to the US and Canada.

Although Africa is one of the smallest contributors to the unauthorised immigrant population in the US, Trump’s policy will affect the US-Africa diaspora connection negatively.

Africa’s share of unauthorised immigrant populations in the US rose from 275 000 of about 10.5-million in 2019 to 375 000 of 11-million in 2022. Hundreds of thousands of Africans in the US could face deportation, affecting remittances from the US to Africa, which were US$13-billion in 2023.

Transactional relations

There is also apprehension that Trump’s transactional and contemptuous outlook towards Africa would negate President Joe Biden’s recognition of African agency, and his doctrine of equal partnership with the continent.

Trump’s approach could mean favourable engagements with strategic African partners, and little with Africa collectively. For example, unlike presidents Barack Obama and Biden, Trump didn’t organise a US-Africa Leaders Summit.

Democracy and human rights

There is uncertainty on how Trump will approach democracy and human rights promotion in Africa. He has displayed his love for autocracy and praised dictators.

This tendency endangers struggling democracies and the course of human rights in Africa. Some leaders may welcome reduced external scrutiny. But this could embolden authoritarian regimes, weaken political accountability, and affect governance standards where democratic institutions are fragile and democracy is declining. Examples include Burkina Faso, Guinea, Gabon, Mali and Niger.

Climate change

Trump believes climate change is a hoax. His return means uncertainty for global climate action, to the detriment of vulnerable African and other developing countries. His focus on fossil fuel expansion could roll back environmental policy. It might also limit US engagement with global climate action initiatives, and lead to reduced funding for African climate adaptation projects and clean energy investments. Given the continent’s high dependency on agriculture, such policy stances could worsen climate vulnerabilities in Africa.

It is also uncertain if Trump can sustain the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, a G7 initiative to drive sustainable and transparent investment in quality infrastructure around the world.

Several African countries such as Kenya, Sierra Leone and Mozambique have benefited from the US-led G7 digital infrastructure projects. Others – such as Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Zambia – stand to benefit from the G7-funded construction of the new 800km rail line connecting these countries, the first open-access transcontinental rail network in Africa. Trump has equally promised massive tariffs on imports, leaving all US trade partners worried.

UN security council transformation

Finally, US support for two African permanent seats at the United Nations security council, promised by the Biden administration, is uncertain under Trump.

Hope and optimism

Still, Trump’s second coming could inspire some hope in three areas.

Firstly, he is unlikely to ignore the increasingly competitive nature of international relations, and Africa’s growing relations with China, Russia and other US competitors.

For example, in his first term, the US maintained a robust counterterrorism presence in Africa. It particularly targeted terrorist groups in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa. Trump 2.0 could therefore see increased military support for counterterrorism initiatives, with a preference for supporting allied nations such as Nigeria and Kenya. However, he might not commit US troops on the ground.

Secondly, Trump’s first term in office provides some reasons for hope of improved US-African trade relations. US trade with 49 African countries declined from US$104.7-billion at the end of President George W Bush’s tenure in 2008, to US$33.7-billion at the end of Obama’s term in 2016. Trade relations improved in the first two years of Trump, reaching US$40.9-billion before sliding to US$32.7-billion with the pandemic in 2020.

US foreign direct investment (FDI) in sub-Saharan Africa rose in the first two years of Trump’s first term, from US$33.7-billion at the end of Obama’ presidency in 2016 to US$39-billion in 2017 and US$40.9-billion in 2018, although it slid to US$32.6-billion the following year and was US$30-billion in 2020. Equally, Africa’s FDI in the US rose from US$4.6-billion in 2016 to US$9.8-billion in 2020.

Thirdly, Trump 1.0 prioritised investment over traditional aid models, arguing for

prosperity through partnership.

This was reflected in his India strategy; similarly with Kenya.

This stance could lead to cuts in humanitarian and development assistance to Africa, affecting health, education and infrastructure projects dependent on aid. However, it could spur Africans to look inwards and help themselves. This could be just what the continent needs to stop its dependency and take the African Continental Free Trade Area initiative seriously.

What should Africa do?

Despite the fear it raises, the second coming of Trump offers opportunities for self-development as Africa may be forced to depend less on US aid. Instead, it could look to harness its vast human and material resources for its own development.

As US priorities shift under Trump 2.0, African leaders will face decisions on how to navigate partnerships to secure investment, maintain political stability, and address the continent’s long-term development needs through inward-looking strategies. This bodes well for the continent in the long run.

In an increasingly multipolar world characterised by multiple powers challenging US hegemony, African countries have an opportunity to pursue diversified alliances. They must balance between US, Chinese, Russian and other international influences in ways that will benefit Africans.

Written by Christopher Isike, Director, African Centre for the Study of the United States, University of Pretoria and Samuel Oyewole, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Department of Political Sciences, University of Pretoria

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.