Without several amendments to its draft framework, SADC will struggle to help member states address their abusive pasts.

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) has embarked on a commendable and much-needed peacebuilding initiative to help prevent the recurrence of violence and authoritarian backsliding in the region.

Countries in Southern Africa are marked by prolonged colonial and post-colonial violence, repressive regimes and entrenched inequalities, and need coherent policies to guide them towards justice, reconciliation and sustainable peace. Member states recently met in Johannesburg to discuss a draft framework that facilitates the design and implementation of post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD) and transitional justice initiatives.

SADC lags behind its counterparts, such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), in developing a PCRD framework. But this initiative positions it as the first regional body in Africa to formally circulate a draft transitional justice policy for member states to consider.

Instead of developing two distinct frameworks, SADC opted to integrate PCRD and transitional justice into one cohesive document. For this approach to work, both domains need adequate attention, but the current draft disproportionately favours PCRD at the expense of transitional justice.

While PCRD and transitional justice share overlapping concerns and can be complementary, they have distinct mandates, methodologies and normative foundations. PCRD typically emphasises infrastructure development, state capacity building and institutional reform, whereas transitional justice focuses on redress, accountability and societal healing.

The draft also lacks reference to contemporary and regionally relevant developments in the transitional justice field. It draws on the 2004 United Nations definition of transitional justice, thereby overlooking the African Union Transitional Justice Policy, adopted in 2019 by all AU member states, including those in SADC.

The AU policy is grounded in African norms, values and approaches – including traditional justice systems – and offers a regionally relevant and contextually appropriate framework. By failing to reference the policy and incorporate its definition, SADC’s draft does not reflect member states’ sociopolitical and cultural contexts.

Also, the draft’s narrow conceptualisation of transitional justice limits its application to post-conflict contexts, overlooking the legacies of authoritarianism. Numerous Southern African states have faced governance-related abuses long after active conflict has ended, including systemic corruption, enforced disappearances and the suppression of dissent.

Transitional justice mechanisms must address post-conflict and post-authoritarian contexts, as both generate serious human rights violations that require recognition and redress.

Another notable omission is mental health and psychosocial support. Although such support is not explicit in the AU policy, it has become essential to contemporary transitional justice and peacebuilding efforts. Survivors of violence often carry hidden scars – trauma, stigma and social dislocation – that traditional transitional justice pillars alone cannot heal.

Experts and practitioners increasingly advocate for mainstreaming mental health support across all transitional justice pillars, while some suggest treating it as a distinct element altogether. A credible transitional justice framework must incorporate such support, not only to promote individual recovery but to enhance societal cohesion and resilience.

Moreover, the SADC draft does not adequately anticipate the implications of emerging threats – particularly climate change and environmental degradation – on peace and justice in the region. Given SADC’s reliance on natural resources and agriculture, the connections between ecological stress, conflict and transitional justice must be articulated.

Many human rights violations in the region have a cross-border dimension, rendering a purely national approach inadequate. Conflicts and repression, for example in Cabo Delgado in Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, often involve more than one state, spilling across borders due to porous boundaries and shared ethnic or political identities.

The framework should provide a basis for cross-border investigations, transnational reparation schemes, and regional truth commissions. Regional organisations are well-positioned to support and sustain such initiatives.

Furthermore, transitional justice within SADC must address not only civil and political rights violations but also violations of economic and social rights – an area where the AU policy remains comparatively underdeveloped. Land dispossession, extractive exploitation, systemic corruption, state capture and poverty should be viewed not merely as development issues, but also as matters of justice.

This has been acknowledged to varying degrees by transitional justice processes in Sierra Leone, Chad, Ethiopia and Liberia, and in cases before the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights.

A comprehensive framework shouldn’t consider transitional justice in isolation. Recent experiences highlight the need for complementarity with other peacebuilding mechanisms such as peace processes, PCRD, national dialogues and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes. The SADC framework should guide countries on coordinating and sequencing these processes.

Furthermore, the final framework must go beyond articulating principles to providing actionable guidance for member states. This includes strategies for contextualising transitional justice at the national level, building institutional capacity to engage with communities, and promoting decentralised implementation.

Transitional justice must be pursued through both top-down and bottom-up approaches. The SADC framework should actively promote inclusive, participatory and decentralised mechanisms that engage communities, civil society organisations and local institutions alongside government actors.

Equally important is the question of monitoring and oversight. SADC may consider the AU policy, which empowers the AU Commission to monitor national transitional justice initiatives.

Parallel mechanisms could enable the SADC Secretariat to support and guide member states. Enhanced collaboration with the AU Commission in Addis Ababa would ensure regional coherence and technical rigour during implementation.

Ultimately, the SADC region needs a transitional justice policy that is not only aligned with AU instruments and informed by regional and international best practices, but also reflects consultations with stakeholders, civil society and communities.

Whether developed as part of the current integrated draft or through a standalone transitional justice framework, the core elements, principles, cross-cutting issues and benchmarks must be identified and agreed on.

Without these revisions, SADC risks falling short of its potential to support member states in confronting their authoritarian and violent pasts and in laying the foundations for justice, reconciliation and peace.

Written by Ikubaje John Gbodi, Head, Transitional Justice Unit, Department of Political Affairs, Peace and Security, African Union Commission & Tadesse Simie Metekia, Senior Researcher, Special Projects, ISS Addis Ababa​