Ouattara’s fourth term landslide win reflects the ongoing struggle to achieve inclusive and trusted democratic governance.

Only half of Côte d’Ivoire’s electorate officially voted in the 25 October polls that returned President Alassane Ouattara to power. It was confirmed on 4 November that Ouattara won a fourth term with 89.77% of the votes, far ahead of his four opponents, who together received only 8.63%.

The low voter turnout (50.10%) reflects the climate of fear and political tension surrounding the process. It is a reminder that Ivorian democracy – particularly regarding elections – remains fragile, 35 years after the introduction of multiparty politics.

Tensions were fuelled by several factors. First, the entire opposition questioned the neutrality of the Independent Electoral Commission (CEI) and reliability of the electoral roll, calling for reform of the former, and an audit and revision of the latter.

Second, the opposition saw the exclusion of Laurent Gbagbo and Tidjane Thiam from the electoral list following court rulings as a move by the authorities to exclude major contenders. Former president Gbagbo was the African People’s Party – Côte d’Ivoire’s (PPA-CI) designated candidate, and Thiam the Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI) candidate.

Finally, Ouattara’s candidacy for a fourth term reignited debates and tensions over its legality, given the constitution’s two-term limit.

Various observer missions deployed countrywide reported that the 25 October vote was generally conducted peacefully. These included the National Human Rights Council, Indigo Côte d’Ivoire, West African Network for Peacebuilding, and Economic Community of West African States-African Union (ECOWAS-AU) mission.

However, leading up to voting day, incidents were reported in several areas, especially Abidjan, Bonoua, Dabou, Daloa, Divo, Gagnoa, Grand-Moutcho and Yamoussoukro. These were caused mainly by opposition supporters protesting against their candidates’ exclusion, despite a two-month ban of public protests decreed on 17 October.

The demonstrations disrupted traffic, destroyed property and election materials, and in Nahio, led to clashes between residents. At least a dozen people reportedly died in election-related incidents, but no official toll has been released.

Since 1995, successive presidential elections in Côte d’Ivoire have struggled to move beyond personal rivalries among ageing political leaders, or recurring attempts by those in power to exclude opponents.

Central to these divisions are weak national cohesion and a lack of independence of electoral institutions, including the judiciary. This highlights the country’s ongoing struggle to establish and consolidate democratic state institutions and heal wounds after the bloody post-election crisis of 2010.

It may still be too early to consider the 2025 election fully closed, as the scars of the tense process remain and may influence the socio-political climate in the coming weeks and months.

The two main political parties that didn’t take part in the polls – the PPA-CI and PDCI – have criticised the process, questioning its democratic nature. They described the election as a ‘civilian coup d’état’ and an ‘electoral heist’, while Ouattara’s fourth term was branded as unconstitutional. The PPA-CI called for continued mobilisation.

The outcome of what could be an ongoing political standoff will depend on the opposition’s ability to mobilise and assert its demands – something it has so far failed to achieve. Meanwhile, the government’s determination and capacity to prevent and contain unrest, which it views as a cover for potential insurrection, remains intact.

While elections are naturally moments of political contestation and heightened emotion, Côte d’Ivoire’s recent violent and turbulent political history underscores the need to avoid normalising instability and turning each election into a repetition of past crises. Similar tensions will likely re-emerge during the 2030 election if nothing changes.

With his swearing-in scheduled for 8 December, Ouattara will begin his final term under the current constitution. Among the many challenges he faces, it is essential that he leaves behind a credible and consensual democratic system.

To achieve this, a thorough revision of the electoral and related laws (nationality code, penal code, etc.) is needed. The format and membership of the electoral institutional framework, centred on the CEI, must also be overhauled.

So far, electoral reforms have emerged from ad hoc political dialogues. Such agreements rarely survive the shifting interests of political actors, who tend to challenge them depending on their position and political advantage.

Given the impact of election-related tensions on Côte d’Ivoire’s stability, reform efforts should not be confined to closed-door negotiations among political elites and a few civil society actors. They need broader consultation and public debate, so that Ivorian society is not held hostage to elite disputes and politicians are held accountable.

Restoring trust in the judiciary is also vital. The institution is regularly accused of being exploited by successive governments for political purposes, particularly during election season. An independent judiciary would strengthen national cohesion and ensure credible polls. It would also enhance the country's attractiveness to foreign investment and create favourable conditions for small and medium-sized enterprises.

The stakes of Côte d’Ivoire’s presidential election were not merely national. Voting occurred amid regional insecurity and political instability, marked by coups and growing criticism about the relevance of the traditional democratic model.

It also occurred in an international context characterised by a crisis of liberal democracy affecting several Western democracies. Moreover, the struggle for influence in West Africa between authoritarian powers, such as China and Russia on one side, and the United States and France on the other, has made Western powers reluctant to openly promote democratic values.

Côte d’Ivoire is viewed as a pillar of stability and socioeconomic development in the subregion. Strengthening its democracy could help ensure the country’s long-term stability.

Regional and international partners such as ECOWAS, the AU, United Nations and European Union should support efforts to improve governance (including anti-corruption efforts), electoral reform, judicial independence and social cohesion.

Written by the Institute for Security Studies