There was not much of a choice, as the three main opposition candidates were banned from standing. Ouattara claimed another first-round landslide victory with 89.77% of votes cast.

As a researcher, I have followed political developments in Côte d'Ivoire over the past 15 years, and I’m currently involved in a project on boycott movements which uses Côte d’Ivoire as a country case.

This informs my view of the 2025 presidential elections and the democratic outlook for Côte d’Ivoire.

While the country tends to be seen as a regional front runner in terms of its economic performance, the 2025 elections continue a worrying trend of democratic backsliding and political polarisation.

The 27 December legislative elections will be a test of the country’s democratic resilience.

The build-up

In the months leading up to the presidential elections, major opposition candidates were excluded and political apathy took hold in a shrinking space for democratic expression.

Ouattara announced his candidacy in August, despite the widespread objections to his third-term candidacy in 2020 at home and abroad.

As in 2020, critics insisted that Ouattara was overstepping his constitutional mandate of one presidential term, renewable once. He has argued that a 2016 revision gave him the right to run twice.

As election day approached, Côte d’Ivoire’s political landscape was marked by polarisation, repression and uncertainty.

Tensions deepened in early September when the Constitutional Council disqualified five prominent opposition candidates from the race. Former president Laurent Gbagbo, Charles Blé Goudé and Guillaume Soro were excluded due to prior criminal convictions. The two main challengers, Tidjane Thiam and Pascal Affi N’Guessan, were barred on procedural grounds.

Their exclusion more or less handed victory to Ouattara, and his campaign comfortably turned towards ensuring an absolute majority.

In early October, the National Security Council banned public gatherings, except those organised by official candidates, on the grounds of “maintaining public order”. It also imposed additional restrictions on civic mobilisation. It used the letter of the law to serve Ouattara’s interests in limiting protests against his candidacy.

Going against the ban, opposition parties called for daily protests, but the gatherings were generally small and promptly broken up by security forces.

Three days before the elections, Gbagbo denounced what he called a “civil coup” and expressed his support for those “protesting against this electoral robbery”.

On 11 October, protesters in Abidjan took to the streets. These acts of defiance led to some 700 arrests and 80 prison sentences for disturbing public order. Eleven people were killed in clashes between security forces and protesters.

Along with other domestic and international observers, Amnesty International denounced the repression of demonstrations. At the same time, the government deployed 40 000 security personnel across the country.

France, the regional grouping Ecowas and the EU have remained largely silent. They have generally prioritised stability and strategic relations with the Ivorian government over democratic accountability. This passivity risks further eroding the credibility of these international actors while reinforcing narratives of western double standards in the region.

While the excluded opposition parties tried, and largely failed, to mobilise their supporters in the streets, the remaining candidates (all representing small and newly formed political parties and coalitions) chose a different strategy.

Capable Generations Movement leader Simone Ehivet Gbagbo (the former first lady, who was divorced from ex-president Gbagbo in 2023) deplored the elimination of her ex-husband. But in the final weeks of campaigning she insisted that it was too late to call people to the streets. She called for people to vote instead.

Election day

Election day was mostly peaceful across the country, but violent clashes did break out in several towns. The president of the Independent Electoral Commission, Ibrahim Kuibiert Coulibaly, described these incidents as “marginal” and “quickly contained”.

While the election result was never in doubt, the participation rate was less predictable. The confirmed participation rate of 50.1% shows that many voters stayed at home; many out of apathy but also out of concerns over the risk of violent clashes around polling stations.

Provisional results announced on 27 October gave Outtara 89.77% of the votes. Along with other opposition members, Thiam lamented a rigged and divisive electoral process with inadequate participation, and urged nonviolent resistance. He called for the government to engage in dialogue towards reconciliation.

The ruling party and media supportive of Ouattara described the result as a “landslide victory”, particularly celebrating Ouattara’s victories in historical opposition strongholds.

Three days after election day, several leaders of the main opposition parties were summoned by police on the grounds that military-grade weapons had been found in the homes of individuals linked to the 11 October march.

So, while the elections may be said to have unfolded without major incidents, the lack of a genuine contest and the measures taken to restrict opposition cast a shadow over the poll, and over Outtara’s legacy.

What’s next, and what are the prospects for democracy?

In the short to medium term, the major opposition parties could salvage some of their influence in the parliamentary elections on 27 December. Or they may reignite protests.

In the long term, Ouattara would have to step towards outright authoritarianism to justify a fifth candidacy in 2030. It seems more likely that he will finally hand over to a successor from his inner circle.

Even if that happens, serious questions remain regarding the electoral framework. The opposition has long claimed that the independent electoral commission is biased in favour of the incumbent.

The Ouattara presidency is tainted by its record of one-sided electoral competitions, political violence and insecurity, and a shrinking space for public expression.

Given Côte d’Ivoire’s strategic importance to the global north, as a rare ally in the subregion, international actors won’t have much to say about its democratic performance.

Any prospects for reconciliation, political reform and a peaceful transition in 2030 will mainly be in the hands of the ruling party. It will have to encourage dialogue and political inclusion at municipal, provincial and regional levels.

The 27 December legislative elections will offer a better chance to understand the actual distribution of political leverage than the flawed presidential elections.

Amelie Stelter of the department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Sweden contributed to this article

Written by Jesper Bjarnesen, Senior researcher, The Nordic Africa Institute

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.