Through investment in the energy, information and communications technology and transportation sectors, the People’s Republic of China has vastly expanded Africa’s essential developmental infrastructure. Such assistance also brings financial and political benefits to China. These projects are financed through interest-bearing loans from Chinese state banks, and Chinese state companies are financially rewarded. However, dependence on Chinese suppliers and management poses risks for African nations, particularly concerning control over telecommunications and port systems. These risks remain largely hypothetical and can be offset through foresight and diversified investment.

Africa’s development paradigm of the 21st century is often presented in the media as a contrast: the West primarily engages Africa as a market for natural resources, while China and the East position themselves as development partners. Supporters of this view indicate that the substantial expansion of African infrastructure has been achieved with Chinese assistance. Growth has occurred primarily in three sectors, creating the potential for dangers when partnerships devolve into dependency, prompting strategies to avoid this pitfall, which is as yet more of a theoretical threat than a reality.

In the energy sector, China has made significant investments into power generation, both in solar farms and in hydropower plants. These projects directly address Africa’s critical energy shortfalls. In the information and communications technology (ICT) sector, China has built a large percentage of Africa’s mobile network infrastructure, for both voice and data transmission, as well as expanded the continent’s capacities in cloud computing, e-commerce and fintech. In transportation, China has built (and in some cases continues to operate) 100 African seaports, constructed or upgraded 10 000 km of rail lines and built roughly 100 000 km of roads and highways and 1 000 bridges. These projects have supported economic growth and improved living standards throughout the continent.

However, such projects carry potential risks, particularly regarding control over completed infrastructure. Control issues come in both the management of projects and in their day-to-day operation. Chinese technicians frequently perform both functions in the absence of skills transfer to local personnel. Fundamentally, China is also a seller of services. Infrastructure projects are a means to not only deploy the services of Chinese construction firms but also to entrench their technologies and technical personnel.

Bridges, dams, highways, ports and rail lines are built and, in some instances, operated by Chinese firms, generating huge profits. Agreements between Chinese and African companies for port development are often tied to treaties that allow the Chinese navy to use these ports for training exercises and to portray military might in Africa. The Chinese firm Huawei has benefitted significantly from its role in establishing African mobile networks since the 1990s. Although Huawei does not disclose its finances, economists estimated the value of its African contracts projects generate-billions of US dollars per year.

China’s financial institutions also benefit greatly from financing Africa’s infrastructure. While Western countries frequently rely on grants, China typically uses loans. The volume and cumulative total of these loans has raised concerns among African and international economists regarding African countries’ ability to service these debts.

In some cases, defaults will result in African assets (like ports and rail lines) transferring to Chinese ownership. Between 2000 and 2023, China provided US$182-billion in loans for infrastructure projects in 49 Africa countries. Only five countries were not indebted to China.

Chinese investment in Africa, while below its historic peak, remains robust
Source: China Africa Research Initiative and National Bureau of Statistics of China, via Swedish National China Centre

African governments have shown awareness of the risks of overdependence on China by diversifying their sources of infrastructure investment. China built Ethiopia’s modern telecommunications system, yet the government has since contracted European firms for additional services and equipment.

Although garnering little attention in the world media, the historic pattern of the US being Africa’s leading trade partner has recently re-emerged. In 2012, China surpassed the US as Africa’s largest investor, but in 2023, the US invested US$7.8-billion across Africa – nearly twice China’s US$4-billion that year. US investment is mostly in mining, and its benefits have been somewhat undercut by the Trump administration’s tariffs imposed on African exports to the US.

China’s declining investment dominance over the US coincides with increased engagement from Brazil, India and Japan on investing in Africa. Because their investments are not tied to loans, they do not contribute to African nations’ debt burden and indicate alternatives for Africa’s development funding to exclusive Chinese financing.

China’s energy investment is not entirely green

China states that making green energy is the cornerstone of its energy investments in Africa. Hydropower, solar and wind projects are underway throughout the continent. The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation’s Beijing Action Plan, covering the country’s African investments, calls for the launching of 30 clean energy projects and identifies nuclear power as a fourth clean energy category. Namibia is exploring nuclear power by using Chinese technology. These benefit both sides: Africa’s energy deficit is addressed by clean, green energies, and Chinese companies expand into African markets.

The largest projects underway in 2025 include the Sounda Hydropower Plant in the Republic of Congo, costing nearly US$10-billion, and Africa’s largest solar power plant in Namibia, costing US$ 89-million. Both projects have the potential to meet national energy needs and export electricity to neighbouring countries. Their completion will stimulate economic growth and improve quality of life.

A significant challenge, however, is debt. Congo and Namibia have secured Chinese financing with interest obligations that will increase their national debt. Both governments expect that the revenues from energy sales and the broader economic growth from expanding energy supplies will enable them to service these loans.

The solution to another challenge, the lack of skills transfer, seems less clear. Kenya’s Lake Turkana Wind Power Project illustrates this challenge. While Kenyan firms profited from their participation in the project’s construction, China retained contractual rights to manage and maintain the wind farm. Rather than fostering energy self-sufficiency, the project has created management dependency. Should the Chinese operators depart for whatever reason, the project would cease to function. This situation is at the heart of cautions raised against a new dependency on developed world technologies and infrastructure expertise. These concerns are rooted in history. When France was displeased with Guinea’s development and foreign policy choices upon its former colony’s independence in 1958, French technicians were withdrawn and chaos ensued at public works projects. Portugal did the same at Mozambique’s independence in 1975. These historic examples are useful as precedents to engender vigilance, without suggesting that China would necessarily do the same.

China’s commitment to investing in Africa’s clean energy is undermined by its far larger investments in fossil fuels. In 2025, China’s spending on oil and gas projects reached an all-time high, led by the US$20-billion oil and gas processing facilities that China is constructing in Nigeria. African nations have less reason to fear reliance on Chinese investment because of the continent’s wealth of oil and gas reserves, which continue to attract global investment. Most of the US investment in Africa is concentrated in the fossil fuel sector.

In ICT, supplies diversification reduces dependency on China

African nations find themselves the most entangled with Chinese investment in the ICT sector. However, the danger of losing national sovereignty over telecommunications is still theoretical and can be thwarted by vigilance and policies like technological diversification. The task is complicated by China’s dominant role in modernising Africa’s ICT infrastructure in the 21st century.

The Chinese companies Huawei and ZTE have established more than 30 national mobile networks across the continent. Huawei alone has constructed 70% of Africa’s 4G network. Many e-government platforms and national security communications rely on Chinese firms to keep operating. ZTE is particularly influential in Angola and Ethiopia, while Huawei is the primary driver of 4G and emerging 5G networks in Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa.

These three countries also have local telecommunications companies and historic connections with European and US telecommunications systems, which could be engaged to diversify away from Chinese technologies and to reduce the risk of Chinese dependence.

In contrast, South Africa has made a political decision, grounded in its BRICS commitments, to further embed its telecommunications systems in Chinese technologies. South Africa sources more than 70% of its ICT infrastructure from China, which earns US$10-billion from South African tech hubs. Telkom South Africa has contracted Huawei to upgrade its systems, and MTN – the South African mobile operator, whose presence throughout Africa makes it one of the continent’s largest mobile systems – has partnered with China Telecom and Huawei to develop AI technology, cloud computing and 5G.

South Africa does not share US concerns that Chinese technology could be used to gather data on users and, through such data harvesting, pose a risk to national security. These fears were heightened when the Chinese gift of a new headquarters for the African Union in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, proved to be an espionage listening post, with microphones embedded in tables and walls of conference rooms where African leaders believed they met in confidence.

Ethiopia responded by securing more ICT deals with European firms, illustrating how technological diversification is a safeguard against monopolisation. In practice, Chinese monopolisation already exists in some areas, and its misuse – the African Union headquarters espionage notwithstanding – remains a potential danger against which steps could be taken.

Independence from embedded Chinese telecommunications technologies will not be easy. Africa’s digital systems now largely use Chinese hardware standards, financed by Chinese banks. Western firms face a financial disadvantage in offering services at higher prices due to Huawei’s and ZTE’s low-interest loans and long credit lines from China’s state banks, the China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China. The savings that these firms can then pass on to African customers appear as either cheaper financing or less expensive products. Consequently, Chinese telecommunications companies can undercut their global competitors’ prices by 30%, particularly with thanks to Beijing’s long-term goal of cornering Africa’s telecommunications market.

Chinese investment in transportation infrastructure highlights control concerns

China generates US$13 in revenue from every US$1 invested in African port infrastructure. These revenues are earned by Chinese firms, whose management of the ports is a condition of the facilities’ construction and financing. Chinese state-owned enterprises control one third of Africa’s maritime hubs – substantially more than in Asian or Caribbean ports – and are involved in 78 ports across 32 African countries as builders, financiers or operators. Their presence is strongest in West Africa, where Chinese firms run 35 ports. Elsewhere in Africa, China is a major stakeholder in 17 East African, 17 Southern African and 11 North African ports.

In some cases, a significant risk comes with the lack of control over port operations, specifically the loss of an African nation’s sovereignty over its own maritime hub. A Chinese company with an operating lease or concession agreement not only earns revenue from managing the ports – collecting fees from every cargo, fishing and passenger ship that docks – but it also controls access to that port.

An operator assigns vessels to berths, and if they so choose, they may refuse landing rights. A Chinese firm operating a port could offer preferred rates or services to Chinese vessels. Chinese firms currently hold concessions in 10 major African ports, and as African nations continue privatising their infrastructure, more African ports may fall under Chinese operational control.

However, Chinese firms have not denied any vessel entry or abused their control of African ports. It is possible for African nations to contractually oblige private port operators to follow set protocols. Denying a vessel entry can introduce into a country’s foreign relations, which can cause issues for any government. The decision to allow or deny port entry to the ships of a particular country should not be put in the hands of a private firm, particularly if that company belongs to a foreign government. Meanwhile, the efficiencies Chinese management bring can offer welcomed relief to the inefficiencies that have made cargo handling at African ports 50% more expensive than the global average.

Strategic responses from African nations to mitigate financial and security risks

China’s investment in African rail and road infrastructure follow the same paradigm. All are guided by Chinese policies that seek to efficiently extract African natural resources, especially minerals and energy products. Such trade policies are guided by capable Chinese-built telecommunications systems, transportation networks and ports facilities.

While this infrastructure supports Africa’s development, China’s primary objective remains its strategic self-interest. Infrastructure development has also come at an additional cost – a financing charge – because as China is now Africa’s largest bilateral lender. Between 2000 and 2023, Chinese financial institutions loaned US$182-billion to African nations, the largest of which are also some of the continent’s largest economies: Angola, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya and Nigeria.

These loans are concentrated in the energy, ICT and transportation sectors for infrastructure development that benefits China. Africa’s debt burden has long concerned institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. African nations are, however, increasingly aware of the risks of financial dependence on China and of yielding operational control of their infrastructure. How Africa nations finesse these risks will determine whether they will be in control of their own development or face a new form of dependency.

The critical points:

• China’s support for African infrastructure has accelerated Africa’s development, particularly in the energy, ICT and transportation sectors
• China’s partnership with Africa is grounded in its own economic self-interest, and its loan-based financing of African infrastructure could lead to heighten debt risk
• China could control key African transportation and ICT systems if African nations do not recognise and mitigate this possibility

Written by In on Africa