Mistrust between AES and ECOWAS countries must be overcome to enable intelligence sharing and security cooperation.

On 8 January, members of the violent extremist Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims attacked a fortified position of the anti-terrorist Operation Mirador in northern Benin. Media reports said the attack at the transfrontier W National Park resulted in at least 30 Beninese soldiers’ deaths – the heaviest loss ever recorded.

Similar attacks occurred on 20 July 2024 against the army outpost at Kpekpakandi in northern Togo and on 2 October 2024 against Togolese troops on the border with Burkina Faso. At least 10 soldiers died in the former, and nine soldiers and 10 civilians in the latter.

While the terror threat varies from country to country, the activism of these groups in the Sahel since 2012, and in Benin and Togo since 2021, shows that no West African nation is immune. According to the Global Terrorism Index, the Sahel remains the global epicentre, accounting for over half of all terror-related deaths in 2024.

Among the coastal states of Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Togo, Côte d’Ivoire was the first to be hit in 2016 at Grand-Bassam. Although it has experienced a relative lull after two years of repeated attacks in its north, the threat remains. The country shares a long border with Mali and Burkina Faso, where security continues to deteriorate.

Ghana is the only country among them that has not experienced terror attacks. However, several incidents have been recorded along its border with Burkina Faso. The same vulnerabilities exploited by groups in other countries – chieftaincy and land disputes, growing discontent with the state and illicit activities such as illegal gold panning – have been documented in Ghana.

Institute for Security Studies (ISS) research in Benin and Côte d’Ivoire also reveals that cattle stolen in the Sahel or coastal countries, or gold mined illegally, are sent to Ghana to finance insurgencies. The ISS study also documented the recruitment of Ghanaians into terrorist groups.

That research and an earlier study in the three Liptako-Gourma countries (Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger) underline the importance of not evaluating the threat based solely on attacks – which are just the visible part of the phenomenon. Indeed, violent extremists’ sources of logistics and operational supplies, funding, and recruitment extend far beyond the sites of attacks.

Several interdependent dynamics have led to terrorism expanding beyond the borders of Sahel countries. These include groups bypassing military and security operations, expanding their areas of operation and their sources of human, operational and financial resources, and finding new hiding places.

Parks and forests such as those of the W-Arly-Pendjari Complex, the Comoé National Park in Côte d’Ivoire and Togo’s Oti-Kéran-Mandouri Complex offer ideal conditions (see map). Controlling and securing these woodlands is difficult. Their size and cross-border nature make aerial surveillance hard and access for insurgents easy.

Parks and forests vulnerable to terrorist activities, West Africa

Porous borders and limited cooperation between Alliance of Sahel States (AES) countries (Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger) on the one hand, and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) members on the other, enable terror groups to expand. Mistrust between the two organisations prevents vital intelligence sharing and coordination of military operations to prevent certain territories from being used as fallback zones.

This situation could see some ECOWAS states forming bilateral ties with AES countries for security and economic reasons. That could stop terrorism from expanding, but given the regional nature of the threat and West Africa’s multi-dimensional security crises, ECOWAS and AES must try to work together.

In March 2024, the AES countries announced the deployment of a joint anti-terrorist force in Liptako-Gourma. However, there is currently no intention to extend the force to the coastal countries bordering the three states. Given their limited resources, AES states and their coastal neighbours must explore how best to collaborate while avoiding separate responses and new ad hoc security arrangements.

At a March chiefs of staff meeting in Abuja, ECOWAS affirmed the need for collective action to improve regional security. To achieve this, ECOWAS and AES countries could capitalise on existing communication channels to relaunch dialogue and collaboration.

ECOWAS appointed Togo, Senegal and Sierra Leone in July 2024 to negotiate with AES countries. Togo played a role in the release of Ivorian soldiers detained in Mali and was the only coastal country to participate in last year’s joint military manoeuvres in Niger between armies of the AES countries and Chad.

Senegal and Ghana appointed special envoys for the Sahel in July 2024 and January 2025 respectively. Both countries’ presidents have undertaken state visits to AES nations to bring ECOWAS and the AES closer together. However, the success of these efforts will depend on whether the AES and ECOWAS can maintain dialogue and coordinate security and development efforts.

Regional collaboration is also needed in response to the Lakurawa group – active since at least 2016 in North-West Nigeria, a region plagued by banditry and criminality. Initially a self-defence group, it was designated this year by Nigeria as a terrorist organisation. It also operates in parts of Niger and has been accused of sabotaging the Niger-Benin oil pipeline.

Collaboration is key to preventing the tri-border area between Benin, Niger and Nigeria from becoming another terror epicentre in West Africa.

Affected states should learn from the experiences of other African countries – like Algeria, Mauritania, Nigeria and Niger – which have established disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes. Despite their limitations, these initiatives have weakened terror groups by encouraging members to leave.

In addition to investing in responses that involve security and non-security measures, actions must be taken to weaken extremist groups by attacking their supply, funding and recruitment chains.

Written by Jeannine Ella Abatan, Senior Researcher, ISS Regional Office for West Africa and the Sahel