Despite some progress, several barriers still prevent citizens from effectively working with the African Union at its Peace and Security Council.

For the African Union (AU), citizens play a key part in realising the continent’s goals. Their role is enshrined in the organisation’s Constitutive Act, which says African leaders are ‘guided by … the need to build a partnership between governments and all segments of civil society, in particular women, youth and the private sector, to strengthen solidarity and cohesion’ among their citizenry.

This commitment was a significant shift from the state-centric approach of the AU’s predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity. It instilled optimism about the AU’s commitment to change and recognition of citizens’ collective strength. But despite some progress, numerous hurdles still limit meaningful civil society interactions.

The AU established several structures and procedures to bridge the divide between citizens and AU institutions, including the Citizens and Diaspora Directorate and the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC). It provided for bilateral memoranda of understanding and granted observer status to civil society organisations (CSOs) at AU summits. These steps created spaces for AU-citizen interactions.

At its first annual retreat in Dakar, Senegal, in 2007, the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) agreed that it could invite civil society actors to address sessions and, over time, devise formulae to guide interactions with CSOs. This culminated in the PSC’s 2008 decision to hold annual meetings with ECOSOCC, known as the Livingstone Formula.

But despite the formula, interactions between the PSC and CSOs remained limited. Since the challenges were discussed at the sixth annual retreat in Maseru in 2014, the PSC has made notable strides in drawing citizens into the process of addressing Africa’s peace and security challenges.

It created institutional spaces such as the annual PSC-CSO meetings and invited CSOs to participate in PSC monthly open sessions as briefers or observers, or both. The council also collaborated with civil society actors to get crucial decisions passed in its conflict prevention and management projects. In addition, it tasked ECOSOCC and the Citizens and Diaspora Directorate with developing a comprehensive database to improve reach and information dissemination among key civil society actors.

This produced significant results. CSO participation in PSC open sessions has increased considerably since Maseru, compared to between 2008 and 2014. Although only two annual consultations between ECOSOCC and CSO representatives have happened in line with the Livingstone Formula, civil society participation in PSC meetings and retreats has increased.

Despite noticeable improvements in some aspects of PSC-citizens relations, several issues continue to hinder effective interactions. Chief among them are institutional challenges and longstanding mistrust among CSOs of AU decision-making spheres, including the PSC.

Various CSOs perceive ECOSOCC as a state-captured institution, which has thwarted progress. Perceptions surrounding Article 6, which states that CSOs registering for ECOSOCC must have at least 50% of resources derived from members of the organisation, have markedly affected ECOSOCC membership. This is particularly true of the ability of members to take up electoral positions, despite the significant progress the organ has made so far.

Little attention has been given to the perennial antagonism between civil society and governments over sensitive governance and security issues in most AU member states. Given that CSOs demand more accountability from their governments in those areas, they are perceived as ‘too activist’. Consequently, their relationship is strained with their host country and sometimes they are denied the capacity to maintain registration in member states as a basis for inclusion in ECOSOCC and eventually the PSC.

ECOSOCC has also been criticised for being urban-centric, excluding grassroots organisations that often meet selection criteria. Such accusations are not necessarily accurate considering ECOSOCC’s holistic approach to mobilising CSOs, covering various themes across the continent under its national chapter concept.

Despite more flexibility in CSOs’ engagement criteria, ECOSOCC has yet to finalise the database, which Maseru recommended 10 years ago to map actors in essential areas such as prevention and mediation. According to sources, this indicates the organisation’s persisting difficulties in encouraging CSOs to subscribe to the PSC-CSO interaction mechanism. Also important is how some member states transpose national-level antagonism against CSOs to the continent by restricting access to strategic meetings, including peace and security engagements.

ECOSOCC’s efforts to mobilise CSOs under its national chapter are highly commendable. As more vibrant PSC-CSO interaction is paramount to achieving peace and stability in Africa, CSO engagement and widening the pool of such organisations will enhance the PSC’s understanding of and response to security challenges. Addressing these barriers will also make civil society experts available for mediation and preventive diplomacy.

Even though not specific to PSC-CSO interactions, the national chapter concept and associated composition of sectoral clusters are solid foundations for extended grassroots citizen engagements. ECOSOCC should use digital platforms to widen its reach and minimise CSOs’ reluctance to engage with it.

The PSC Secretariat should also step up advocacy efforts by assuaging governments’ concerns about including civil society in managing continental peace and security challenges.

Written by Moussa Soumahoro, Researcher, Africa Peace and Security Governance, ISS Addis Ababa

This article was first published in the ISS’ PSC Report.