Several steps can ensure that Africa uses its numerical advantage in the agreement to influence critical upcoming negotiations.

The watershed BBNJ Agreement governing areas beyond national jurisdiction that cover 64% of the ocean’s surface, entered into force on 17 January. Although these shared resources are vital to planetary health and human wellbeing, they have remained heavily overexploited, polluted and abused without an overarching framework.

The Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction Agreement fills major governance and regulatory gaps across the entire zone from the high seas down to the international seafloor.

Currently, only 18 (out of 54) African countries are parties to the agreement, while 36 have signed. That means Africa constitutes a fifth of all state parties and nearly a quarter of all signatories. The continent’s ability to shape the new regime should be stronger.

Africa is the largest regional bloc at the United Nations (UN), yet its relative weight has not translated in the BBNJ context. The Asia Pacific group now contributes 26 parties and 39 signatories in the evolving coalition politics surrounding the agreement.

UN rules say only states and regional economic organisations that have signed, ratified, approved, accepted or acceded to the agreement can fully participate in the Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) – the interim body tasked with preparing for its implementation. PrepCom meets for the third time in March to define operational arrangements for consideration at the first BBNJ Conference of the Parties (COP) meeting later this year.

The longer Africa’s key powers remain non-parties, the less chance the continent has to influence global ocean governance. In terms of economic, naval and scientific powers, relevant countries are Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa. Angola and Tanzania are political leaders, serving as respective chairs of the African Union (AU) and Nairobi Convention – a regional ocean governance agreement.

Africa’s 38 coastal states comprise small island developing states, least developed countries (LDCs) and middle-income countries (MICs). Sixteen others are landlocked developing countries (LLDCs) – most being LDCs and three are MICs. This unique diversity gives the continent a broad spectrum of positions in conservation, maritime transport, fisheries, deep-sea mining and maritime security.

Continued tight coordination will be needed by Africa’s PrepCom bureau members: Sierra Leone, Mauritius and South Africa. All African BBNJ states parties can participate fully so the treaty’s rules reflect and advance this range of perspectives.

The BBNJ’s entry into force launches a new phase in a decades-long struggle to conserve and sustainably use areas beyond national jurisdiction, and advance equity, access and development. To implement these goals in a tense geopolitical climate, African countries must mobilise their combined weight of diverse states, scientists, legal experts and other stakeholders.

It is vital that more African states turn signatures into ratifications to become BBNJ parties. Current parties include global powers such as France and China (bidding to host the agreement’s secretariat), alongside major UN budget contributors like Japan and Brazil. The United Kingdom and Germany aim to join before COP1.

Together, these countries can give the UN the strong funding needed for the agreement to work. Consequently, the budgetary burden on African governments, a key financial issue to watch, will be manageable, allowing them to focus on governance, not cost.

To continue shaping the treaty’s ability to serve Africa’s security and economic interests and build ecological resilience, countries with relevant technical, legal and political capacity must convert their signatures into party status.

Most states that haven’t signed or ratified are either LLDCs or face intense conflict and severe economic fragility. Their lack of ocean access and more urgent priorities must be considered by international actors seeking universal ratification.

Still, that landlocked Malawi and Botswana are parties, and Lesotho, Zambia and Zimbabwe are signatories, shows that African LLDC policymakers are not seeing the BBNJ as merely a ‘coastal club’.

A country like Somalia, challenged by domestic and regional security issues, may find the treaty useful for enhancing monitoring, surveillance, and control capabilities needed to tackle piracy and illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing.

In a fractured global landscape, countries with deep security issues may be hesitant to invest in multilateral processes on other issues. Regional peers who are signatories and parties must show these states that the agreement offers more than global environmental protection; it is a strategic asset for national maritime security and blue economies.

African policymakers also need to clear the ‘legal fog’ around unresolved maritime boundaries and pending submissions to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf – a UN body reviewing states’ claims to extend their continental shelves. Many of these claims overlap with areas beyond national jurisdiction.

The BBNJ agreement does not undermine states’ rights under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. So countries concerned about prejudice to their continental shelf claims should consult peers that are BBNJ parties with similar claims for the assurance needed to move forward.

To ensure Africa does not miss the boat, three steps are essential ahead of COP1.

First, African signatories and prospective states parties can leverage international environmental resources to accelerate ratification and prioritise national interests, particularly in marine science and security.

Second, existing BBNJ states parties must work within their regional economic communities to help neighbours. These are Sierra Leone and Nigeria in the Economic Community of West African States; Seychelles and South Africa in the Southern African Development Community; and Kenya in the East African Community. These bodies have the mandate to facilitate peer learning.

Furthermore, Kenya as host of the upcoming Our Ocean Conference and Angola as AU chair should use their roles to align continental strategies.

Third, Africa must not let external interests dictate the BBNJ agenda. States must resolve intracontinental maritime boundary disputes threatening to fracture the bloc. A unified front can ensure the treaty serves African priorities.

With a partial COP1 expected in late 2026, the window for action is narrowing fast. African countries must step on deck or stay ashore. Delays in converting signatures into ratifications risk handing the captain’s seat in global ocean governance back to the usual wealthier powers.

Written by Jeremy Raguain, Founder, Out of the Shell Solutions, Seychelles & David Willima, Researcher, Maritime, ISS Pretoria