Stability in West Africa requires that both organisations take pragmatic and flexible approaches, and learn from past mistakes.

Military juntas in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger formed a confederation at the first summit of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) on 6 July. The decision consolidates relations between the three countries, which launched the AES last September as a mutual defence pact against external and internal threats, including terrorism.

In January, the three announced their intention to leave the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Niger’s General Abdourahamane Tiani confirmed that decision at the opening of the 6 July summit, stating that ‘the peoples of the Sahel have irrevocably turned their backs on ECOWAS.’ The issue was also on the agenda of the ECOWAS summit held on 7 July.

Despite the AES leaders’ determination to withdraw, ECOWAS appointed Senegalese President Bassirou Diomaye Faye and Togo’s President Faure Gnassingbé to facilitate talks to keep the breakaway states in the bloc. The three should accept the regional organisation’s extended hand and give diplomacy a chance. This would enable them to reach an agreement with ECOWAS while contributing to a new regional dynamic.

Their withdrawal announcement has triggered an existential crisis for ECOWAS, which could push the bloc to make political concessions in the short term, and reform its peace and security processes in the long run. Indeed, ECOWAS announced on 7 July that a special summit would be held on regional integration in West Africa, ‘taking into account the state of governance, peace and security and the regional integration project.’

ECOWAS is nevertheless preparing for the exit of the three central Sahel states when the statutory one-year period for withdrawing expires on 28 January 2025. The summit instructed the ECOWAS Commission to draw up a contingency plan ‘to deal with all eventualities in relations with [the] AES countries.’

A break-up appears inevitable in light of the deteriorating political situation and the intransigence of AES leaders. If that happens, the two parties must strive to engage in constructive dialogue in the interest of a stable region.

To that end, ECOWAS must remember that AES is a natural and relevant format for cooperation between three countries facing common security challenges that threaten their very existence. In fact, AES mirrors the Liptako-Gourma Integrated Development Authority created in 1970 by the same three states to develop this cross-border region.

Similarly, the AES counter-terrorism force created in March 2024 is a revitalisation of the Liptako-Gourma multinational security force announced in 2017, after the three countries had become the epicentre of terrorism in West Africa. The Liptako-Gourma force was however abandoned when the G5 Sahel Joint Force was created with French support. Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have since withdrawn from the G5 Sahel as part of their rejection of external influence over governance matters.

For its part, AES would gain from normalising diplomatic relations with neighbouring countries. It is widely perceived as a disruptive element in regional cooperation, even though it was created after ECOWAS threatened to intervene militarily in Niger following the July 2023 coup.

At a time when the global trend is towards integration and the formation of blocs, some believe the three states could remain within ECOWAS in the form of the AES. This follows examples like the Mano River Union (Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire) or the Accra Initiative (Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Mali, Niger and Togo).

Should the Faye-Gnassingbé talks fail, AES states should organise an orderly withdrawal from ECOWAS. Easing their rhetoric about the regional organisation and its member states could help build bridges and forge bi- or multilateral agreements to ensure the free movement of AES and ECOWAS populations in their respective areas.

Regarding security, AES won’t be able to deal effectively with terrorism on its own. A decade of military interventions in the region shows that treating the Sahel and the Gulf of Guinea countries as two disconnected zones has been a strategic error on the part of the international community. Given the cross-border nature of violent extremism, AES and neighbouring ECOWAS countries must pool their efforts to tackle the growing threat.

Intelligence-sharing channels must be set up and maintained with Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, Benin and Togo. The Accra Initiative – which brings together these four countries, the AES states and Nigeria as an observer – could provide a useful platform.

Frameworks for collaboration should also be developed with countries bordering the AES space, such as Guinea, Senegal, Chad, Libya, Mauritania and Algeria. And the AES should work with the African Union’s continental peace and security architecture.

AES and ECOWAS must also mitigate the geopolitical risks West Africa is now exposed to. The alignment of the three central Sahel states with Russia, at a time when Western countries are repositioning themselves in the region’s coastal states, brings face-to-face two blocs supported by opposing great powers.

For AES, this means ensuring the autonomy of its joint force. Drawing lessons from the experience of the G5 Sahel Joint Force – perceived as being under French control – the central Sahel states must limit Russia’s operational role and its monopoly over training and equipment supply.

Similarly, ECOWAS must not allow itself to be used as part of the West’s policy to contain Russian influence in the region. For example, the organisation’s plan to deploy a US$2.6-billion a year standby force to combat the region’s security crises should be funded by member states’ military resources, not Western partners. It should also be structured to ensure synergies with the joint AES force.

To resolve the crisis constructively, AES and ECOWAS must be flexible in their positions. Maintaining dialogue and coordinating security and development policies are vital to safeguard their respective interests and those of the region’s people, who are bound by kinship, history and culture.

Written by Djiby Sow, Senior Researcher, ISS Regional Office for West Africa, the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin; and Hassane Koné, Senior Researcher, ISS Regional Office for West Africa, the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin