New research shows that key figures in South Africa’s domestic online influence industry are engaged in transnational disinformation campaigns.

A recent study on digital disinformation during the 2024 elections reveals that the Electoral Commission of South Africa (IEC) and other democratic institutions were primary targets for coordinated campaigns promoting false narratives.

The Institute for Security Studies (ISS) research also shows how the role of network affiliations across Africa appears to be growing in importance.

Self-appointed and unaccountable online personas were found to command huge audiences and control narratives by joining forces with influencers across borders. The objective is either to share inauthentic material or game (‘trick’) the social media algorithms that determine how content is ranked, so their posts get maximum exposure.

Interviews with some of the country’s most prominent online political influencers – some driven by ideology and others by financial gain – revealed how they were outsourcing their know-how and tactics to other African countries.

This matters because much of the public debate about information operations has focused on the role of superpowers like Russia, China and increasingly the United States (US), with little attention paid to Africa’s influence market.

The year-long ISS study found that key figures in South Africa’s influence industry were engaged in transnational coordinated campaigns. This includes so-called rage bait used to provoke a response and boost engagement.

One of South Africa’s top influencers told the ISS how he engaged with the Kenyan X community before the polls using antagonistic, often nationalist-themed interactions to ‘provoke reactions’ on South Africa-Kenyan rivalries. He could then appropriate networks and build his audience based on negative engagement. He said he was embarking on similar tactics in Botswana, Zimbabwe and Nigeria.

Such campaigns give social media audiences the false impression that discussions about a particular domestic issue are organic – the natural result of open and rigorous debate. Instead, they are due to manipulations by an external influencer stirring the pot.

Such coordinated transnational campaigns also seek to trick social media algorithms into prioritising certain narratives and drowning out others, distorting the information environment. This tactic has been seen in other settings, including Rwanda, where gaming techniques seek to muffle dissent.

Another prominent South African influencer claimed Russian agents paid him to amplify narratives aimed at ‘destabilising’ South Africa during the polls. He said he was provided with pre-packaged material and paid up to R50 ($US2.7) each time he liked a post. While this cannot be independently verified, the ISS study revealed he was a leading online figure whose account was suspended in June 2024.

The research did not seek to identify foreign influence campaigns. However, key issues such as the Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Palestine wars were featured among the content of those amplifying South African election material.

While overt foreign influence appears to have been limited in this case, other research describes how states – notably Russia – mask their identities and shape domestic debate using local accounts. These promote a particular perspective on an issue and dress it up as a domestic debate.

More broadly, the ISS study found that the biggest influence ‘communities’ online were associated with two political parties. From a sample of 1.2-million documents on X and over 177 000 on Facebook, the uMkhonto weSizwe (MK) and Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) parties were the ‘loudest’ voices on the platforms.

Both ‘had an outsized effect on the conversation given their final election results’ (MK 14.58%, EFF 9.58%). Furthermore, both ‘appear to have benefitted from paid influencers including those ideologically aligned to the party.’

The Democratic Alliance, the fourth biggest community in the sample, seemingly spent more resources than other parties on traditional political advertising (rather than paid online influencers). The report observed that ‘these ads are transparent […] it is clear which political party is paying for them, allowing voters to assess the narrative in that light.’

While social media enables many people to access information quickly and can be vital in holding power to account, it has also become fertile ground for spreading misleading narratives that undermine democratic processes.

During a recent conference to discuss the study, IEC and Government Communication and Information Service representatives said despite efforts to mitigate such campaigns, mis/disinformation flourished.

The conference noted that the rise of artificial intelligence and the rapid spread of disinformation would probably make such campaigns harder to track, with a noticeable shift towards smaller, localised networks such as WhatsApp.

The study found that fact-checking organisations and the traditional media played a significant role in debunking disinformation during South Africa’s elections. However, Meta plans to end fact-checking by third parties, so content warnings by the platform, like those of Africa Check during the election, could become history.

Aldu Cornelissen, part of the ISS research team speaking at the Cape Town conference, said since the Ukraine invasion, ‘we are seeing the American right being pulled into influence campaigns.’

Indeed, Elon Musk’s false narratives in early February about land expropriation and the public furore that followed may have been a clumsy stunt to justify subsequent US aid cuts to South Africa. However, it highlights that Africa is rapidly becoming a zone of online contestation between geopolitical adversaries.

While the conference called for tech platforms to take more responsibility for the material they publish, the prospect of regulation looks increasingly shaky given US President Donald Trump’s recent executive order to ‘stop government censorship’ on social media.

More research is needed to understand Africa’s rapidly expanding information ecosystem. Concerted lobbying by African leaders and their European allies of the tech giants is also vital to ensure they respond to local contexts where disinformation thrives.

Moreover, targeted digital literacy training is urgently needed. This should be considered for South Africa’s civil servants, journalists and non-governmental organisations to avoid them becoming ‘unwitting foot soldiers’ by inadvertently amplifying mischievous messaging campaigns.

Lessons can be learnt from the cybercrime community where campaigns run by the private sector, including banks, seek to raise awareness. While not a perfect solution, it could offer South Africa some protection.

Written by Karen Allen, Consultant, ISS Pretoria