The forum’s summit, taking place every three years, provides a platform for China to show off its global influence, and for African nations, both individually and collectively, to engage with the world’s second-largest economy on political and economic matters.

This year’s summit is an opportunity for Africa to find a way through the challenges of the post-Covid era. Previous summits have yielded tangible benefits for African nations. For instance, Kenya has become the largest exporter of flowers to China, with annual exports valued at US$800-million, since the eighth China-Africa summit in Dakar in 2021.

Another positive spin-off linked to the opening of new trade between African countries and China since 2021 is the promotion of e-commerce. This, for instance, has enabled Ethiopian coffee to be exported to China. And, through the China-Africa Peace and Security Fund, Chinese finance and equipment was channelled towards the African Peace and Security Architecture.

The significance that African states place on the forum is evident: 53 African countries will participate in the three-day summit. The only exception is eSwatini, which has diplomatic ties with Taiwan.

As a researcher who has closely monitored China’s ascent as a global power and published extensively on the subject, I suggest the question is how African states can maximise this opportunity to benefit politically and economically.

China’s Africa strategies

China’s plans are clear. It outlined comprehensive strategies in 2006, 2015 and 2021. These detail China’s position in its relations with African states, as part of its broader ambitions as a global power.

At the last Forum on China-Africa Cooperation summit in 2021, four documents were adopted. Of these, the 2035 Vision for China-Africa Cooperation stands out. It outlines the overall framework of cooperation for 15 years.

The plan was jointly developed by China and African countries. But observers noted that its most striking aspect was that its time frame coincided with China’s own 2035 plan: Vision 2035.

Unlike China, African states have yet to produce a comprehensive, unified policy document outlining the continent’s strategic interests, and how these align with the China-Africa Vision for Cooperation 2035.

The vision aims to, among other things, foster cooperation for the development of China and Africa, with China supporting the implementation of the African Union’s 2063 Agenda – the blueprint for turning Africa into a future economic power house. China would also help in the industrialisation of Africa. The vision also promotes cooperation in the blue economy.

Strengthening Africa’s position

The ninth Forum on China-Africa Cooperation takes place against a backdrop of challenges in China-Africa relations. Africa’s debt to China is a sticking point. China has provided over US$170-billion in loans to 49 African nations and regional institutions from 2000 to 2022.

Angola, Ethiopia, Kenya and Zambia bear particularly high levels of Chinese debt. They are aware that Beijing is unlikely to write off more debt easily.

Despite these challenges, Africa is not without agency in its dealings with China. Although the continent is not economically strong as a whole, with its 54 UN member states out of 193 it holds considerable geopolitical importance.

The continent’s voting power in international affairs is undoubtedly of importance for China. To use this power in its relationship with China, Africa should have a clear vision and a strategic approach.

To strengthen their position, African states must unite and adopt a more coordinated approach. African nations often negotiate individually, rather than as a bloc. This weakens their bargaining power.

In the absence of a unified African position, the question is whether African states can instead negotiate as regional economic communities. This is a monumental task. But leading African states and the regional blocs could begin by crafting engagement strategies, then use their competitive advantages to benefit from relations with China.

This is especially important given China’s status as a highly sophisticated entrepreneurial state with a clear strategy and substantial financial resources. Effective leadership is key to developing a unified African strategy.

The African private sector must play a more active role in advocating for the continent’s interests in discussions with the world’s second largest economy. It’s worth noting that in July, the ruling Chinese Communist Party unveiled significant market-oriented reforms.

These developments continued President Xi Jinping’s shift from high-speed to high-quality development. Discussions to prepare for the 2024 summit also highlighted the issues of economic viability, local community benefits and environmental sustainability.

Market-oriented reforms are expected to accelerate the trend seen at the 2021 Dakar summit, moving from state-led initiatives to increased private sector involvement.

To enhance the continent’s position, African states should have already discussed and adopted a unified stance ahead of the 2024 summit. Failing to work and bargain in a more consolidated manner leaves Africa at a disadvantage. It allows China to dictate the agenda and use the forum as a tool for its geopolitical ambitions.

Looking forward

In recent years some observers have argued that China’s engagement with the African continent is motivated by a desire for access to its natural resources. The relationship has become, in fact, much more nuanced and multifaceted.

Africa also plays a role in China’s call for a community of developing countries as a counterweight to a western-based international order. On this view, the 2024 summit in Beijing will be a pivotal event for both China and Africa.

It is likely to influence the future direction of their partnership. This is important to China and its global priorities, and for Africa in using its interactions with China to the benefit of the continent.

Written by Theo Neethling, Professor of Political Science, Department of Political Studies and Governance, University of the Free State

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.