Despite the Belt and Road’s mixed record in Africa, careful involvement in China’s smaller, greener projects could be beneficial.

China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has gained significant traction in Africa since its launch in 2013, with 53 African nations participating in varying degrees. In 2023, African countries received US$21.7-billion in BRI deals, including investments in ports, railways and renewable energy.

As China shifts BRI towards smaller, greener and less risky projects, Africa will have much to gain from the programme. But countries need to be more proactive in aligning the potential benefits with their own strategic priorities, and galvanising efforts to strengthen the governance of BRI.

September’s Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) is an opportunity for Africa to enhance its agency. China will use FOCAC to deepen BRI cooperation, with discussions focusing on concessional development finance, infrastructure and trade. The shift from the Dakar Action Plan (2022-2024) to a new framework has already sparked debate about its potential impact on Africa.

Originally conceived to emulate the ancient Silk Road trade routes, the BRI has grown significantly. It now involves 151 countries spanning Asia, Africa, Europe and Latin America. It includes the Digital Silk Road and Health Silk Road, broadening its scope beyond infrastructure to encompass various fields including tourism, capacity building and nuclear energy.

The BRI has a strategic element, providing China with a platform to project its power globally. The initiative ensures long-term access to resources and markets while positioning China as a key ally to developing nations, challenging traditional Western dominance in these regions.

The BRI also offers an alternative source of development finance, particularly benefitting poorer African nations by addressing substantial infrastructure investment deficits with minimal conditions. Consequently, China has become a pivotal lender in Africa, extending loans exceeding US$170-billion to 49 African countries and regional institutions from 2000-22. BRI projects are often executed swiftly by Chinese contractors on a turnkey basis, making them more attractive than the slower, condition-heavy financing from institutions like the World Bank and African Development Bank.

However, BRI projects haven’t always been well conceived or strategically chosen, leading to outcomes that fail to deliver the desired economic impact. Kenya’s Standard Gauge Railway for example has been criticised for not being economically viable or benefitting local communities. These kinds of ‘white elephant’ projects intensify worries about debt sustainability – if they don’t generate sufficient economic benefit, countries may struggle to repay loans.

While BRI projects have contributed to debt distress in some host countries, experts argue that this isn’t a deliberate strategy by Beijing. The ‘debt trap diplomacy’ narrative has been challenged, with an emphasis on Chinese banks’ need to recover their investments. For instance, Ethiopia renegotiated its US$4-billion railway project loan, extending the repayment period without losing control over the infrastructure. However, the impact of commercial loans for BRI projects still comes under scrutiny, as in the Zambia case.

Despite state guarantees and high interest rates, Beijing has reassessed its appetite for high-risk lending and scaled back accordingly, with an increasing emphasis on sustainable investments. The ‘small and beautiful’ model of BRI investment, established in 2021, focuses on smaller, greener, less financially risky projects for both Beijing and host countries.

The aim is to mitigate the environmental degradation and social discontent that have plagued some of the larger, more ambitious projects such as Uganda’s Kampala-Entebbe Expressway. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s keynote speech at the third Belt and Road Forum in 2023 emphasised a strategic shift towards more sustainable, community-focused projects. He highlighted priority areas such as renewable energy, healthcare and technology, which are expected to yield long-term benefits for local communities.

Regardless of Beijing’s attempts to improve the BRI’s outcomes, success will be limited if African countries do not approach the initiative more proactively. Paul Nantulya, a Research Associate and China Specialist at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, emphasises the importance of African agency and ownership in strengthening accountability and reducing risk.

‘When all the initiative in terms of concept, design, funding instruments and execution comes from Chinese entities, the BRI partner country may feel less accountable domestically, leading to wastage and undermining public engagement,’ he says.

African countries must develop a strategic approach towards the programme, he says. ‘While the BRI is primarily a Chinese initiative with strategic elements, there has been insufficient policy thinking on the African side to articulate Africa’s strategic interests and approach towards China.’

It is unlikely that China, under Xi Jinping’s leadership, will abandon the BRI. Rather, the initiative is evolving, engaging new stakeholders and changing modes of operation. Stephen Brawer, Chairman of the Belt & Road Institute in Sweden, says the BRI remains crucial to China’s global strategy and economic diplomacy. He says Beijing has already adjusted the initiative to enhance its sustainability, suggesting it will continue being a significant force in international relations.

A leaner BRI addresses numerous problems, enabling development that has a more immediate impact on local communities, such as renewable energy projects in Kenya and South Africa. It also better aligns with the African Union’s Agenda 2063. A reformed BRI could be a valuable tool for Africa’s development, but won’t fix all the continent’s problems.

The most significant lesson from a decade of African engagement is clear: countries must define their goals and strategies before engaging with external actors. Otherwise, they risk becoming platforms for the agendas of external powers, weakening their own domestic credibility in the process.

In the build-up to this year’s FOCAC, African countries must prepare to articulate clearly what they want from Beijing. This will involve having conversations with regional counterparts and considering how new projects fit into broader initiatives, such as the African Continental Free Trade Area.

Written by Jana de Kluiver, Research Officer, Africa in the World